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Abstract
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without
monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains
unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with
additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a
complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the play-
ers. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthfulmechanisms,
showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players
pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by themechanism, and an ex-
change part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable
to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences
on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fair-
ness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide
tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this
agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions tomore players.
1 Introduction
Westudy a very elementary and fundamentalmodel for allocating indivisible goods fromamech-
anism design viewpoint. Namely, we consider a set of indivisible items that need to be allocated
to a set of players. An outcome of the problem is an allocation of all the items to the players, i.e.,
a partition into bundles, and each player evaluates an allocation by his own additive valuation
function. Our primarymotivation originates from the fair division literature, where suchmodels
have been considered extensively. However, the same setting also appears in several domains,
including job scheduling, load balancing andmany other resource allocation problems.
The focus of our work is on understanding the interplay between truthfulness and fairness
in this setting. Hence, we want to identify the effects on fairness guarantees, imposed by elim-
inating any incentives for the players to misreport their valuation functions. This type of ques-
tions has been posed already in previous works and for various notions of fairness, such as envy-
freeness, or for the concept ofmaximin shares [see,among others, Lipton et al., 2004, Caragiannis et al.,
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2009, Amanatidis et al., 2016]. However, the results so far have been rather scarce in the sense
that a) inmost cases, they concern impossibility results which are far from being tight and b) the
proof techniques are based on constructing specific families of instances that do not enhance our
understanding on the structure of truthful mechanisms, with the exception of Caragiannis et al.
[2009] which, however, is only for two players and two items.
In order to comprehend the trade-offs that are inherent between incentives and fairness, we
first take a step back and focus solely on truthfulness itself. As is quite common in fair division
models, we will not allow any monetary transfers, so that a mechanism simply outputs an allo-
cation of the items. Hence, the question we want to begin with is: what is the structure of truthful
allocation mechanisms?
There has been already a significant volume of works on characterizing truthful allocation
mechanisms for indivisible items, yet there are some important differences from our approach.
First, a typical line of work studies this question under the additional assumption of Pareto effi-
ciency or related notions [Pápai, 2000, Klaus andMiyagawa, 2002, Ehlers and Klaus, 2003]. The
characterization results that have been obtained show that the combination of truthfulness to-
gether with Pareto efficiency tends tomake the class of available deterministicmechanisms very
poor; only some types of dictatorship survive when imposing both criteria. Second, in some
cases the analysis is carried out without any restrictions on the class of valuation functions, i.e.,
not evenmonotonicity, which again often results in a very limited class of mechanisms [see, e.g.,
Pápai, 2001]. When moving to a specific class, such as the class of additive functions which is
usualy assumed in fair division, it is conceivable that we can have a much richer class of truthful
mechanisms. The results above indicate that the known characterizations of truthful mecha-
nisms are also dependent on further assumptions, whichmay be well justified in various scenar-
ios, but they are not aligned with the goal of fair division.
1.1 Contribution
Our main result is a characterization of deterministic truthful mechanisms that allocate all the
items to two players with additive valuations. In doing so, we identify some important alloca-
tion properties that every truthful mechanism should satisfy. One such crucial property is the
notion of controlling items (Definition 3.7); we say that a player controls an item, whenever it is
possible to report values that will guarantee him this item, regardless of the other player’s valu-
ation function. We show that truthfulness implies that every item is controlled by some player.
Exploiting this property further, greatly helps us in understanding how a mechanism operates.
Consequently, our analysis and the characterization we eventually obtain reveals an interesting
structure underlying all truthful mechanisms; they can all be essentially decomposed into two
components: (i) a selection partwhere players pick their best subset among prespecified choices
determined by themechanism, and (ii) an exchange partwhere players are offered the chance to
exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. Hence, we call them picking-exchange mech-
anisms.
Next, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mecha-
nisms with (approximate) fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness in Sec-
tion 4, starting our discussion with the more standard ones such as proportionality and envy-
freeness, and explainingwhy such concepts cannot be attained—even approximately—by truth-
ful mechanisms. We then focus on more recently studied relaxations of either envy-freeness or
proportionality where positive algorithmic results have been obtained (e.g., finding allocations
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that are envy-free up to one item, or achieve approximate maximin share guarantees). For these
notions, we provide tight bounds on the approximation guarantees of truthful mechanisms, set-
tling some of the open problems in this area [Caragiannis et al., 2009, Amanatidis et al., 2016].
Interestingly, our results also reveal that the best truthful approximation algorithms for fair divi-
sion are achieved by ordinalmechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that exploit only the relative ranking
of the items and not the cardinal information of the valuation functions.
The heart of our approach for obtaining lower bounds on the approximability of fairness
criteria, is a necessary condition for fairness in view of our notion of control, which we call no
control of pairs. It states that no player should control more than one item. We show how this
condition summarizes minimum requirements for various fairness concepts previously studied
in the literature. Although this condition does not offer an alternative fairness criterion, it is a
useful tool for showing lower bounds.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide a general class of truthfulmechanisms for the case ofmultiple
players. This class generalizes picking-exchange mechanisms in a non-trivial way. As indicated
by ourmechanisms, there is amuch richer structure in the case of multiple players. In particular,
the notion of control does not convey enough information anymore. Instead, there seem to exist
several different levels of control.
1.2 RelatedWork
The only work we are aware of, in which a full characterization is given for truthful mechanisms
with indivisible items, additive valuations, and no further assumptions is by Caragiannis et al.
[2009]. However, this is only a characterization for two players and two items. Apart from char-
acterizations, there have been several works that try to quantify the effects of truthfulness on
several concepts of fairness. For the performance of truthful mechanisms with respect to envy-
freeness, see Caragiannis et al. [2009] and Lipton et al. [2004], whereas for max-min fairness see
Bezakova and Dani [2005]. Coming tomore recent results and along the same spirit,Amanatidis et al.
[2016] and Markakis and Psomas [2011] study the notion of maximin share allocations, and a
related notion of worst-case guarantees respectively. They obtain separation results, showing
that the approximation factors achievable by truthful mechanisms are strictly worse than the
known algorithmic (nontruthful) results. Obtaining a better understanding for the structure of
truthful mechanisms and how they affect fairness has been an open problem underlying all the
above works. For a better andmore complete elaboration on fairness and the numerous fairness
concepts that have been suggested, we refer the reader to the books [Brams and Taylor, 1996,
Robertson andWebb, 1998,Moulin, 2003] and the recent surveys Bouveret et al. [2016], Procaccia
[2016].
There has been a long series of works on characterizing mechanisms with indivisible items
beyond the context of fair divison. Manyworks characterize the allocationmechanisms that arise
whenwe combine truthfulnesswith Pareto efficiency [see, e.g., Pápai, 2000, Klaus andMiyagawa,
2002, Ehlers and Klaus, 2003]. Typically, such mechanisms tend to be dictatorial, and it is also
well known that economic efficiency ismostly incompatiblewith fairness [see,e.g., Bouveret et al.,
2016]. Another assumption that has been used is nonbossiness, which means that one cannot
change the outcome without affecting his own bundle. For instance, Svensson [1999] assumes
nonbossiness in a setting where each player is interested in acquiring only one item. For general
valuations, this also leads to dictatorial algorithms [Pápai, 2001]. In most of these works ties are
ignored by considering strict preference orders over all subsets of the items, while in some cases
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it is also allowed for the mechanism not to allocate all the items.
There have also been relevant works for the setting of divisible goods [see, among others,
Chen et al., 2013, Cole et al., 2013]. We note that for additive valuation functions, a mechanism
for divisible items can be interpreted as a randomized mechanism for indivisible items. This
connection is already discussed and explored in Guo and Conitzer [2010], Aziz et al. [2016]. In
our work, we do not study randomizedmechanisms, however it is an interesting question to have
characterization results for such settings as well. Along this direction, see Mennle and Seuken
[2014] where a relaxed notion of truthfulness is studied.
Related to our work is also the literature on exchangemarkets. These are models where play-
ers are equipped with an initial endowment, e.g., a house or a set of items. For the case where
players can have multiple indivisible items as their initial endowment, see Pápai [2003, 2007].
Exchange markets provide an example where the existing characterizations go well beyond dic-
tatorships and are closely related to the exchange component of our mechanisms.
Finally, for settings with payments, the work of Dobzinski and Sundararajan [2008], and in-
dependently of Christodoulou et al. [2008], provided a characterization of truthful mechanisms
with two players and additive valuations when all items are allocated. However, their charac-
terization does not apply to our setting because they make an additional assumption, namely
decisiveness. It roughly requires that each player should be able to receive any possible bundle of
items, by making an appropriate bid. Their motivation is the characterization of truthful mech-
anisms with bounded makespan (maximum finishing time) for the scheduling problem, and in
their case decisiveness is necessary in order to achieve bounded guarantees. In our case, ourmo-
tivation is fairness, and decisiveness is a very strong assumption which has the opposite effects
of what we need; e.g., assigning the full-bundle to a player is unacceptable in terms of fairness.
Finally, Christodoulou and Kovács [2011] give a global characterization of envy-free and truthful
mechanisms for settings with payments, when there are multiple players but only two items.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
With the exception of Section 5, we consider a setting with two players and a set ofm indivisible
items, M = {1, . . . ,m} = [m], to be allocated to the players. We assume that each player i has an
additive valuation function vi over the items, so that for every S ⊆M , vi (S) =
∑
j∈S vi ({ j }). For
j ∈M , we write vi j instead of vi ({ j }).
We say that (S1,S2, . . . ,Sk) is a partition of a set S, if
⋃
i∈[k]Si = S, and Si ∩ S j = ; for any
i , j ∈ [k] with i 6= j . Note that we do not require that Si 6= ; for all i ∈ [n]. An allocation of M to
the players is a partition in the form S = (S1,S2). By M we denote the set of all allocations ofM .
The set Vm of all possible profiles is R
m
+ ×R
m
+ , i.e., we assume that vi j > 0 for every i ∈ {1,2}
and j ∈M . For some statements we need the assumption that the players’ valuation functions
are such that no two sets have the same value. So, let V 6=m denote the set of such profiles, i.e.,
V
6=
m =
{
(v1,v2) ∈ Vm
∣∣∣ ∀S,T ⊆ [m] with S 6= T, and ∀i ∈ {1,2}, ∑
j∈S
vi j 6=
∑
j∈T
vi j
}
.
Definition 2.1. A deterministic allocation mechanism with no monetary transfers, or simply a
mechanism, for allocating all the items in M = [m], is a mapping X from Vm to M . That is, for
any profile v, the outcome of the mechanism is X (v)= (X1(v),X2(v)) ∈M , and Xi (v) denotes the
set of items player i receives.
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Amechanism X is truthful if for any instance v= (v1,v2), any player i ∈ {1,2}, and any v
′
i
:
vi (Xi (v))≥ vi (Xi (v
′
i ,v−i )).
Since we will repeatedly argue about intersections of Xi (v) with various subsets ofM , we use
X S
i
(v) as a shortcut for Xi (v)∩S, where S ⊆M .
2.1 Fairness concepts1
Several notions have emerged throughout the years as towhat can be considered a fair allocation.
We define below the concepts that we will examine in Section 4. Although all concepts can be
clearly defined for any number of players, we provide the definitions for two players, since this is
the focus of the paper.
We start with two of the most dominant solution concepts in fair division, namely propor-
tionality and envy-freeness.
Definition 2.2. An allocation S = (S1,S2) is
1. proportional, if vi (Si )≥
1
2
vi (M), for i ∈ {1,2}.
2. envy-free, if v1(S1)≥ v1(S2), and v2(S2)≥ v2(S1) .
Proportionality was considered in the very first work on fair division by Steinhaus [1948].
Envy-freeness was suggested later by Gamow and Stern [1958], and with a more formal argu-
mentation by Foley [1967] and Varian [1974].
Envy-freeness is a stricter notion than proportionality, but even for the latter existence can-
not be guaranteed under indivisible goods. One can also consider approximation versions of
these problems as follows: Given an instance I , let E (I ) be the minimum possible envy that
can be achieved at I , among all possible allocations. We say that a mechanism achieves a ρ-
approximation, if for every instance I , it produces an allocation where the envy between any
pair of players is at most ρE (I ). Similarly for proportionality, suppose that an instance I ad-
mits an allocation where every player receives a value of at least c(I )
2
vi (M) for some c(I ) ≤ 1.
Then a ρ-approximation would mean that each player is guaranteed a bundle with value at least
ρc(I )
2
vi (M).
Apart from the approximation versions, the fact that we cannot always have proportional
or envy-free allocations gives rise to relaxations of these definitions, with the hope of obtaining
more positive results. We describe below three such relaxations, all of which admit either exact
or constant-factor approximation algorithms (not necessarily truthful) in polynomial time.
The first such relaxation is the concept of envy-freeness up to one item, where each person
may envy another player by an amount which does not exceed the value of a single item in the
other player’s bundle. Formally:
Definition 2.3. An allocation S = (S1,S2) is envy-free up to one item, if there exists an item a1 ∈ S1,
and an item a2 ∈ S2, such that vi (Si )≥ vi (S j \ {a j }), for i , j ∈ {1,2}.
It is quite easy to achieve envy-freeness up to one item, e.g., a round-robin algorithm that
alternates between the players and gives them in each step their best remaining item suffices.
Other algorithms are also known to satisfy this criterion [see Lipton et al., 2004].
1The material of this subsection is needed in the sequel only within Section 4.
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A more interesting relaxation from an algorithmic point of view, comes from the notion of
maximin share guarantees, recently proposed by Budish [2011]. For two players, the maximin
share of a player i is the value that he could achieve by being the cutter in a discretized form
of the cut and choose protocol. This is a guarantee for player i , if he would partition the items
into two bundles so as to maximize the value of the least valued bundle. We define below the
approximate version of this notion. Recall thatM is the set of all allocations ofM .
Definition 2.4. Given a set of items [m], themaximin share of a player i ∈ {1,2}, is
µi =max
S∈M
min{vi (S1),vi (S2)} .
For ρ ≤ 1, an allocation S = (S1,S2) is called a ρ-approximatemaximin share allocation if vi (Si )≥
ρ ·µi , for i ∈ {1,2}.
For two players maximin share allocations always exist and even though they are NP-hard
to compute, we have a PTAS by reducing this to standard job scheduling problems. Hence each
player can receive a value of at least (1− ǫ)µi . For a higher number of players, constant factor
approximation algorithms also exist [see Procaccia andWang, 2014, Amanatidis et al., 2015].
Finally, a related approach was undertaken by Hill [1987]. This work examined what is the
worst case guarantee that a player can have as a function of the total number of players and
the maximum value of an item across all players. For two players, the following function was
identified precisely as the guarantee that can be given to each player. Note that the total value of
the items is normalized to 1 in this case.
Definition 2.5. Let V2 : [0,1]→ [0,1/2] be the unique nonincreasing function satisfying V2(α) =
1/2 for α= 0, whereas for α> 0:
V2(α)=
{
1−kα if α ∈ I (2,k)
1− (k+1)
2(k+1)−1
if α ∈NI (2,k)
where for any integer k ≥ 1, I (2,k)=
[
k+1
k(2(k+1)−1)
, 1
2k−1
]
and NI (2,k)=
(
1
2(k+1)−1
, k+1
k(2(k+1)−1)
)
.
Markakis and Psomas [2011] proved that for two players, there always exists an allocation
such that each player i receives at least V2(αi ), where αi = max j∈[m] vi j . The approximation
version of this notion would be to construct allocations where each player receives a value of at
least ρV2(αi ). Recently, a stricter variant of this guarantee has been provided by Gourvès et al.
[2015] (also see Remark 4.9).
3 Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms
We present our main characterization result in this section. We start in subsection 3.1 with the
main definitions and illustrating examples, and then we state our result in subsection 3.2 along
with a road map of the proof. To avoid repetition, when referring to a truthful mechanism X ,
we mean a truthful mechanism for allocating all the items in M to two players with additive
valuation functions.
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3.1 A Non-Dictatorial Class of Mechanisms
The main result of this section is that every truthful mechanism is a picking-exchange mecha-
nism (Theorem 3.6). Before we make a precise statement, we formally define the types of mech-
anisms involved and provide illustrating examples.
PickingMechanisms. We start with a family ofmechanismswhere playersmake a selection out
of choices that the mechanism offers to them. Given a subset S of items, we define a set of offers
O on S, as a nonempty collection of proper subsets of S that exactly covers S (i.e.,
⋃
T∈O T = S),
and in which there is no common element that appears in all subsets (i.e.,
⋂
T∈O T =;).
Definition 3.1. AmechanismX is a picking mechanism2 if there exists a partition (N1,N2) ofM ,
and sets of offers O1 and O2 on N1 and N2 respectively, such that for every profile v,
Xi (v)∩Ni ∈ argmax
S∈Oi
vi (S).
Technical nuances aside, such a mechanism can be implemented by first letting player 1
choose his best offer from O1 and giving what remains from N1 to player 2. Then it lets player
2 choose his best offer from O2 and gives what remains from N2 to player 1. The following exam-
ple illustrates a pickingmechanism.
Example 1. Consider the following mechanism X on a set M = {1, . . .6}, which first partitions
M into N1 = {1,2,3,4},N2 = {5,6} and then constructs the offer sets O1 = {{1,2}, {2,3}, {4}},O2 =
{{5}, {6}}. On input v, X first gives to player 1 his best set—with respect to v1—among {1,2}, {2,3}
and {4}, and then gives what remains from N1 to player 2. Next, X gives to player 2 his best set—
according to v2—among {5} and {6}, and then gives what remains fromN2 to player 1. X resolves
ties lexicographically, e.g., in case of a tie, {1,2} is preferred to {4}.
It is not hard to see thatX is truthful. For the following input v , the circles denote the alloca-
tion.
v =
(
3 5 5 10 4 2
2 3 6 1 5 3
)
.
Exchange Mechanisms. We now move to a quite different class of mechanisms. Let X ,Y be
two disjoint subsets of M . We call the ordered pair (X ,Y ) an exchange deal. Moreover, we say
that an exchange deal (X ,Y ) is favorable with respect to v if v1(Y ) > v1(X ) and v2(Y ) < v2(X ),
while it is unfavorable with respect to v if v1(Y ) < v1(X ) or v2(Y ) > v2(X ). Let S and T be two
disjoint subsets of items and let S1,S2, . . . ,Sk and T1, . . . ,Tk be two collections of nonempty and
pairwise disjoint subsets of S and T respectively. We say then that the set of exchange deals
D = {(S1,T1), (S2,T2), . . . , (Sk ,Tk)} on (S,T ) is valid.
Definition 3.2. A mechanism X is an exchange mechanism3 if there exists a partition (E1,E2)
of M , and a valid set of exchange deals D = {(S1,T1), . . . , (Sk ,Tk)} on (E1,E2), such that for every
profile v, there exists a set of indices I = I (v)⊆ [k] for which
X1(v)=
(
E1
⋃
i∈I
Si
)
∪
⋃
i∈I
Ti , X2(v)=M \X1 .
2Picking mechanisms are a generalization of truthful picking sequences for two players [see Bouveret and Lang,
2014].
3If we think about E1,E2 as fixed a priori, then exchange mechanisms are a generalization of fixed deal exchange
rules in general exchange markets for two players [see Pápai, 2007].
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Moreover, I contains the indices of every favorable exchange deal with respect to v,but no indices
of unfavorable exchange deals.
On a high level, an exchange mechanism initially partitions the items into endowments for
the players, and then examines a list of possible exchange deals. Every exchange that improves
both players is performed, while every exchange that reduces the value of even one player is
avoided. Themechanismmay also perform other exchanges where one player is indifferent and
the other player can be either indifferent or improved. Whether such exchange deals are materi-
alized or not is up to the tie-breaking rule employed by the mechanism. The following example
illustrates an exchangemechanism.
Example 2. Let M = {1, . . .5}, and consider the following mechanism Y , with E1 = {1,2,3}, E2 =
{4,5}, and a valid set of exchange dealsD = {({2,3}, {4})} on (E1,E2): One can think of such amech-
anism as ifY initially reserves the set E1 for player 1 and the set E2 for player 2. Then it examines
whether exchanging {2,3}with {4} strictly improves bothplayers, and performs the exchange only
if the answer is yes. Mechanism Y is an example of an exchange mechanism with only one pos-
sible exchange deal. Again, one can see that no player has an incentive to lie.
For the following input v , the circles denote the allocation produced.
v =
(
6 2 3 7 1
1 6 1 4 7
)
.
Picking-Exchange Mechanisms Finally, we define the class of picking-exchange mechanisms
which is a generalization of both picking and exchangemechanisms.
Definition 3.3. Amechanism X is a picking-exchange mechanism if there exists a partition (N1,
N2,E1,E2) of M , sets of offers O1 and O2 on N1 and N2 respectively, and a valid set of exchange
dealsD = {(S1,T1), . . . , (Sk ,Tk)} on (E1,E2), such that for every profile v,
Xi (v)∩Ni ∈ argmax
S∈Oi
vi (S) and X1(v)∩ (E1∪E2)=
(
E1
⋃
i∈I
Si
)
∪
⋃
i∈I
Ti ,
where I = I (v)⊆ [k] contains the indices of all favorable exchange deals, but no indices of unfa-
vorable exchange deals.
It is helpful to think that a picking-exchangemechanism runs independently a pickingmech-
anism on N1∪N2 and an exchange mechanism on E1∪E2, like in Example 3. Although this is
true under the assumption that the players’ valuation functions are such that no two sets have
the same value, it is not true for general additive valuations. The reason is that the tie-breaking
for choosing the offers from O1 and O2 may not be independent from the decision of whether to
perform each exchange that is neither favorable nor unfavorable.
The following example illustrates a picking exchangemechanism.
Example 3. Let M = {1, . . . ,11}, and consider the mechanism Z that partitionsM into N1 = {1,2,
3,4}, N2 = {5,6}, E1 = {7,8,9} and E2 = {10,11}, and is the combination of X and Y from the
previous two examples: On input v, Z runs X on N1∪N2 and Y on E1∪E2 (where Y should of
course be adjusted to run on {7, . . . ,11} instead of {1, . . . ,5}). It outputs the union of the outputs of
X and Y .
For the following input v , the circles denote the final allocation.
v =
(
3 5 5 10 4 2 6 2 3 7 1
2 3 6 1 5 3 1 6 1 4 7
)
.
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3.2 Truthfulness and Picking-Exchange Mechanisms
Essentially, we show that a mechanism is truthful if and only if it is a picking-exchange mecha-
nism. We begin with the easier part of our characterization, namely that under the assumption
that each valuation function induces a strict preference relation over all possible subsets, every
picking-exchangemechanism is truthful. Recall that the set of such profiles is denoted by V 6=m .
Theorem3.4. When restricted to V 6=m , every picking-exchangemechanismX for allocatingm items
is truthful.
Remark 3.5. For simplicity, Theorem 3.4 is stated for a subclass of additive valuation functions.
However, it holds for general additive valuations as long as the mechanism uses a sensible tie-
breaking rule (e.g., label-based or welfare-based, see Remark A.1 in Appendix A). The proof is
very similar.4
We are now ready to state the main result of this work.
Theorem 3.6. Every truthful mechanism X can be implemented as a picking-exchange mecha-
nism.
The rest of this subsection is a road map to the proof of Theorem 3.6. The proof is long and
technical, so for the sake of presentation, it is broken down to several lemmata. In order to illus-
trate the high-level ideas, the proofs of those lemmata are deferred to the Appendix A.
For the rest of this subsection we assume a truthfulmechanismX for allocating all the items
inM = [m] to two players with additive valuation functions. Every statement is going to be with
respect to thisX .
3.2.1 The Crucial Notion of Control
We begin by introducing the notions of strong desire and of control, which are of key importance
for our characterization. We say that player i strongly desires a set S if each item in S has more
value for him than all the items ofM S combined, i.e., if for every x ∈ S we have vi x >
∑
y∈M S vi y .
Definition 3.7. We say that player i controls a set S with respect to X , if every time he strongly
desires S he gets it whole, i.e., for every v = (v1,v2) in which player i strongly desires S, then we
have that S ⊆ Xi (v) .
Clearly, givenX , any set S can be controlled by at most one player.
The following is a key lemma for understanding how truthful mechanisms operate. The
lemma togetherwith Corollary 3.9 below show that every item is controlledby someplayer under
any truthful mechanism.
Lemma3.8 (Control Lemma). Let S ⊆M. If there exists a profile v= (v1,v2) such that both players
strongly desire S, and S ⊆ Xi (v) for some i ∈ {1,2}, then player i controls every T ⊆ S with respect to
X .
4Describing all such tie-breaking rules seems to be an interesting, nontrivial question for future work, but not
our main focus here. It is not hard to see, though, that there exist tie-breaking rules that make a picking-exchange
mechanism nontruthful, e.g., break ties on offers of player 1 so that the value that player 2 gets fromN1 isminimized.
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Proof. Let v= (v1,v2) be a profile such that both players strongly desire S and S ⊆ X1(v) (the case
where S ⊆ X2(v) is symmetric). We first prove the statement for T = S. Let v
′ = (v ′1,v
′
2) be any
profile in which player 1 strongly desires S, i.e., v ′1x >
∑
y∈M S v
′
1y ,∀x ∈ S. Initially, consider the
intermediate profile v∗ = (v1,v
′
2). If S ∩ X2(v
∗) 6= ; then player 2 would deviate from profile v
to v∗ in order to strictly improve his total utility. So by truthfulness we derive that S ⊆ X1(v
∗).
Similarly, in the profile v′, if S ∩ X2(v
′) 6= ; then player 1 would deviate from v′ to v∗ in order to
strictly improve. Thus by truthfulness we have S ⊆ X1(v
′). We conclude that player 1 controls S.
Now, suppose that v′′ = (v ′′1 ,v
′′
2 ) is any profile in which player 1 strongly desires T ( S. If T *
X1(v
′′) then player 1 could strictly improve his utility by playing v ′1 from before (i.e., he declares
that he strongly desires S) and getting S)T . Thus, by truthfulness, T ⊆ X1(v′′), and we conclude
that player 1 controls T .
Notice here that the existence of sets that are controlled by some player is always guaranteed.
Specifically, each singleton {x} is always controlled (only) by one of the players. Indeed, when
both players strongly desire {x}, it is always the case that {x} ⊆ Xi (v) for some i ∈ {1,2}. This is
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.9. Let X be a truthful mechanism for allocating the items in M to two players with
additive valuations. For every x ∈M there exists i ∈ {1,2} such that only player i controls {x} with
respect to X .
Aside from its use in the current proof, the corollary has implications on fairness, that will be
explored in Section 4.
3.2.2 Identifying the Components of aMechanism
Our goal now is to determine the “exchange component” and the “picking component” of mech-
anism X . Every picking-exchange mechanism is completely determined by the seven sets N1,
N2, O1, O2, E1, E2, and D mentioned in Definition 3.3 (plus a deterministic tie-breaking rule).
Below we try to identify these sets. Later we show that the mechanism’s behavior is identical to
that of a picking-exchangemechanism defined by them.
To proceed, we will need to consider the collection of all maximal sets controlled by each
player. For i ∈ {1,2}, let
Ai = {S ⊆M | player i controls S and for any T ) S, i does not control T } .
Clearly, every set controlled by player i is a subset of an element of Ai . According to Lemma 3.8,
if we consider the set Ci =
⋃
S∈Ai S, i.e., the union of all the sets in Ai , this is exactly the set of
items that are controlled—as singletons—by player i .
Corollary 3.10. The sets C1 and C2 define a partition of M.
Using the Ai s and the Cis, we define the sets of interest that determine the mechanism. We
begin with Ei =
⋂
S∈Ai S for i ∈ {1,2}. As we are going to see eventually in Lemma 3.18, the “ex-
change component” of X is observed on E1∪E2.
Defining the corresponding valid set of exchange deals D is trickier, and we need some ter-
minology. Recall that X S
i
(v) = Xi (v)∩ S. For S ⊆ E1 and T ⊆ E2, we say that (S,T ) is a feasible
exchange, if there exists a profile v, such that X
E1∪E2
1 (v)= (E1 S)∪T . In such a case, each of S and
T is called exchangeable. An exchangeable set S is called minimally exchangeable if any S ′ ( S
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is not exchangeable. Finally, a feasible exchange (S,T ) is aminimal feasible exchange, if at least
one of S and T is minimally exchangeable. Now let
D = {(S,T ) | (S,T ) is a minimal feasible exchange with respect to X } .
Of course, at this point it is not clear whether D is well defined as a valid set of exchange deals,
and this is probably the most challenging part of the characterization.
Next, we define Ni =Ci Ei and Oi = {S Ei | S ∈Ai } for i ∈ {1,2}. As shown in Lemmata 3.11
and 3.12, we identify the “picking component” ofX onN1∪N2, andOi will correspond to the set
of offers.
Note that by Corollary 3.10 and the above definitions, (N1,N2,E1,E2) is a partition ofM . The
intuition behind breakingCi intoNi and Ei is that player i has different levels of control on those
two sets. The fact that Ei is contained in every maximal set controlled by player i will turn out to
mean that X gives the ownership of Ei to player i . On the other hand, the control of player i on
Ni is muchmore restricted as shown below.
3.2.3 Cracking the Picking Component
The first step is to show that the Oi s defined above, greatly restrict the possible allocations of the
items of N1∪N2. In particular, whatever player i receives from Ni must be contained in some set
of Oi .
Lemma 3.11. For every profile v and every i ∈ {1,2}, there exists S ∈Oi such that X
Ni
i
(v)⊆ S.
The idea behind the proof of Lemma 3.11 is that by receiving some X
Ni
i
(v) not contained in
any set of Oi , player i is able to extend his control to subsets not contained inCi , thus leading to
contradiction. The proof, as many of the proofs of the remaining lemmata, includes the careful
construction of a series of profiles, where in each step one has to argue about how the allocation
does or does not change.
Given the restriction implied by Lemma 3.11, next we can prove that the subset of Ni that
player i receives must be the best possible from his perspective, hence the mechanism behaves
as a picking mechanism on each Ni . Intuitively, suppose that player 1 receives a subset S of N1
which is not an element of O1. By Lemma 3.11, S is contained in an element S
′ of O1. Since
player 1 controls S ′, this means that he gave up part of his control to gain something that he
was not supposed to. Actually, it can be shown that it is the case where player 2 also gave part
of his control (either on N2 or E2). This mutual transfer of control, combined with truthfulness,
eventually leads to profiles where some of the items must be given to both players at the same
time, hence a contradiction.
Lemma 3.12. For every profile v and every i ∈ {1,2}we have X
Ni
i
(v) ∈ argmaxS∈Oi vi (S).
Now we know that X behaves as the “right” picking-exchange mechanism on N1∪N2. For
most of the rest of the proof we would like to somehow ignore this part ofX and focus on E1∪E2.
3.2.4 Separating the Two Components
As mentioned right after Definition 3.3, there is some kind of independence between the two
components of a picking-exchange mechanism, at least when restricted on V 6=m . This indepen-
dence should be present in X as well; in fact we are going to exploit it to get rid of N1∪N2 until
the last part of the proof.
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Lemma 3.13. Let v= (v1,v2),v
′ = (v ′1,v
′
2) ∈ V
6=
m such that vi j = v
′
i j
for all i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ E1∪E2.
Then X
E1∪E2
1 (v)= X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′).
The lemma states that assuming strict preferences over all subsets, the allocation of E1∪E2
does not depend on the values of either player for the items in N1∪N2. What allows this separa-
tion is the complete lack of ties in the restricted profile space.
Without loss of generality we may assume that E1∪E2 = [ℓ]. We can define a mechanismXE
for allocating the items of [ℓ] to two players with valuation profiles in V 6=
ℓ
as
XE (v)= (X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′),X
E1∪E2
2 (v
′)), for every v ∈ V 6=
ℓ
,
where v′ is any profile in V 6=m with vi j = v
′
i j
for all i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ [ℓ]. This newmechanism is just
the projection of X on E1∪E2 restricted on a domain where it is well-defined. The truthfulness
of XE on V
6=
ℓ
follows directly from the truthfulness of X on V 6=m . Moreover, it is easy to see that
player i controls Ei with respect to XE , for i ∈ {1,2}.
The plan is to study XE instead of X , show that XE is an exchange mechanism, and finally
sew the two parts of X back together and show that everything works properly for any profile
in Vm . One issue here is that maybe the set of feasible exchanges with respect to XE is greatly
reduced, in comparison to the set of feasible exchangeswith respect toX , because of the restric-
tion on the domain. In such a case, it will not be possible to argue about exchanges in D that
are not feasible anymore. It turns out that this is not the case; the set of possible allocations (of
E1∪E2) is the same, whether we consider profiles in Vm or in V
6=
m .
Lemma 3.14. For every profile v ∈ Vm there exists a profile v
′ ∈ V
6=
m such that X (v)=X (v
′).
In particular, the set of feasible exchanges on E1∪E2 is exactly the same for X and XE , and
thus we will utilize the following set of exchanges.
D = {(S,T ) | (S,T ) is a minimal feasible exchange with respect to XE } .
3.2.5 Cracking the Exchange Component
In the attempt to show that XE is an exchange mechanism, the first step is to show that D is
indeed a valid set of exchange deals.
Lemma 3.15. D is a valid set of exchange deals on (E1,E2).
The above lemma involves threemain steps. First we show that eachminimally exchangeable
set is involved in exactly one exchange deal. Then, we guarantee that minimally exchangeable
sets can be exchanged only with minimally exchangeable sets, and finally, we show that mini-
mally exchangeable sets are always disjoint. There is a common underlying idea in the proofs
of these steps: whenever there exist two feasible exchanges that overlap in any way, we can con-
struct a profile where both of them are favorable but the two players disagree on which of them
is best. On a high level, each player can “block” his least favorable of the conflicting exchanges,
and this leads to violation of truthfulness.
Lemma3.15 implies that every exchangeable set S⊆ E1 can be decomposed as S =W∪
⋃
i∈I Si ,
whereW = S
⋃
i∈I Si does not contain any minimally exchangeable sets. Ideally, we would like
two things. First, the setW in the above decomposition to always be empty, i.e., every exchange-
able set should be a union of minimally exchangeable sets. Second, we want every union of
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minimally exchangeable subsets of E1 to be exchangeable only with the corresponding union of
minimally exchangeable subsets of E2, and vice versa. It takes several lemmas and a rather in-
volved induction to prove those. A key ingredient of the inductive step is a carefully constructed
argument about the value that each player must gain from any exchange (see also Lemma A.14
in Appendix A).
Lemma 3.16. For every exchangeable set S ⊆ E1, there exists some I ⊆ [k] such that S =
⋃
i∈I Si .
Moreover, S is exchangeable with T =
⋃
i∈I Ti and only with T .
Finally, we have all the ingredients to fully describeXE as an exchangemechanism on E1∪E2
and set of exchange dealsD.
Lemma 3.17. Given any profile v ∈ V 6=
ℓ
, each exchange in D is performed if and only if it is fa-
vorable, i.e., X
E1∪E2
1 (v) = (E1
⋃
i∈I Si )∪
⋃
i∈I Ti , where I ⊆ [k] contains exactly the indices of all
favorable exchange deals in D.
3.2.6 Putting theMechanism Back Together
As a result of Lemma 3.17 (combined, of course, with Lemmata 3.12 and 3.13), the characteri-
zation is complete for truthful mechanisms defined on V 6=m . For general additive valuation func-
tions, however, we need a littlemore work. This is to counterbalance the fact that in the presence
of ties the allocations of N1∪N2 and E1∪E2 may not be independent.
By Lemmata 3.14 and 3.16, we know that for any v ∈ Vm , X
E1∪E2
1 (v) is the result of some ex-
changes of D taking place. There are two things that can go wrong: X performs an unfavorable
exchange, or it does not performa favorable one. In either of these cases it is possible to construct
some profile in V 6=m that leads to contradiction. Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.18. Given any profile v ∈ Vm , X
E1∪E2
1 (v) = (E1
⋃
i∈I Si )∪
⋃
i∈I Ti , where I ⊆ [k] contains
the indices of all favorable exchange deals in D, but no indices of unfavorable exchange deals.
Clearly, Lemma 3.18, together with Lemma 3.12 concludes the proof of Theorem 3.6.
3.3 Immediate Implications of Theorem 3.6
Asmentioned in Section 1.2, there are several works characterizing truthfulmechanisms in com-
bination with other notions, such as Pareto efficiency, nonbossiness, and neutrality (these re-
sults are usually for unrestricted, not necessarily additive valuations). Pareto efficiency means
that there is no other allocation where one player strictly improves and none of the others are
worse-off. Non-bossinessmeans that a player cannot affect the outcomeof themechanismwith-
out changing his own bundle of items. Finally, neutrality refers to a mechanism being consistent
with a permutationon the items, i.e., permuting the items results in the correspondingpermuted
allocation.
Although such notions are not ourmain focus, the purpose of this short discussion is twofold.
On one hand, we illustrate how our characterization immediately implies a characterization for
mechanisms that satisfy these extra properties under additive valuations, and on the other hand
we see how these properties are either incompatible with fairness or irrelevant in our context.
To begin with, nonbossiness comes for free in our case, since we have two players and all the
items must be allocated. Neutrality and Pareto efficiency, however, greatly reduce the space of
available mechanisms. Note that it makes more sense to study neutral mechanisms when the
valuation functions induce a strict preference order over all sets of items.
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Corollary 3.19. Every neutral, truthful mechanism X on V 6=m can be implemented as a picking-
exchange mechanism, such that
1. there exists i ∈ {1,2} such that Ei = [m], or
2. there exists i ∈ {1,2} such that Ni = [m] and Oi = {S ⊆ [m] | |S| = κ} for some κ<m.
Corollary 3.20. Every Pareto efficient, truthful mechanism X can be implemented as a picking-
exchange mechanism, such that
1. there exists i ∈ {1,2} such that Ei = [m], or
2. there exists j ∈ [m] such that Ei1 = { j }, Ei2 = [m] { j }, where {i1, i2}= {1,2}, and D = {(E1,E2)},
or
3. there exists i ∈ {1,2} such that Ni = [m] and Oi = {S ⊆Ni | |S| =m−1}.
The proofs are deferred to the full version.
It is somewhat surprising that the resultingmechanisms are a strict superset of dictatorships,
even when we impose both properties together. Pareto efficiency, however, allows only mecha-
nisms that are rather close to being dictatorial, and thus cannot guarantee fairness of any type.
On the other hand, most of the mechanisms defined and studied in Section 4 are neutral, yet
neutrality is not implied by the fairness concepts we consider, nor the other way around.
4 A Necessary Fairness Condition and its Implications
In this section, we explore some implications of Theorem 3.6 on fairness properties, i.e., on the
design ofmechanismswhere on top of truthfulness,wewould like to achieve fairness guarantees.
All the missing proofs from this section are in Appendix B.
In Section 4.1we show that theControl Lemma implies that truthfulness prevents any bounded
approximation for envy-freeness and proportionality. Then, we move on describing a necessary
fairness condition, in terms of our notion of “control”, that summarizes a common feature of
several relaxations of fairness and provide a restricted version of our characterization that fol-
lows this fairness condition. This will allow us, in Section 4.2, to examine what this new class of
mechanisms can achieve in each of these fairness concepts.
4.1 Implications of the Control Lemma.
4.1.1 Control of singletons.
The basic restriction that truthfulness imposes to every mechanism (leading to poor results for
some fairness concepts) comes fromCorollary 3.9, an immediate corollary of theControl Lemma,
stating that every single item is controlled by some player.
We begin by studing how the above corollary affects two of the most researched notions in
the fair division literature, namely proportionality and envy-freeness. It is well known that even
without the requirement for truthfulness, it is impossible to achieve any of these two objectives,
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simply because in the presence of indivisible goods, envy-free or proportional allocations may
not exist.5
This leads to the definition of approximation versions of these two concepts for settings with
indivisible goods. Namely Lipton et al. [2004] considered theminimum envy problem and tried
to construct algorithms such that for every instance, an approximation to theminimumpossible
envy admitted by the instance is guaranteed. Similarly Markakis and Psomas [2011] considered
approximate proportionality, i.e., find allocations that achieve an approximation to the best pos-
sible value that an instance can guarantee to all agents. See also the discussion in Section 2 on
defining the approximation versions of these problems. Note that if time complexity is not an
issue, we can always identify the allocation with the best possible envy or with the best possible
proportionality, achieveable by a given instance.
We are now ready to state our first application, showing that truthfulness prohibits us from
having any approximation to the minimum envy or to proportionality. This greatly improves the
conclusions of Lipton et al. [2004] and Caragiannis et al. [2009] that truthfulmechanisms cannot
attain the optimal minimum envy allocation.
Application 4.1. For any truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players with ad-
ditive valuations, the approximation achieved for either proportionality or the minimum envy is
arbitrarily bad (i.e., not lower bounded by any positive function of m).
Proof. Consider a setting with m items, and a truthful mechanism X . Suppose now that item
1 is controlled by player 1 with respect to X . This means that in the profile v = ([m 1 1 . . . 1],
[md 1 1 . . . 1]) player 1 must obtain item 1, and player 2 ends up with a negligible fraction of his
total value for large enough d . The optimal solution would be to assign the first item to the sec-
ond player and the lastm items to the first player, which provides an envy-free and proportional
allocation. We conclude that the approximation guarantee that can be obtained by a truthful
mechanism is arbitrarily high.
So far, the conclusion is that even approximate proportionality or envy-freeness are quite
stringent and incompatible with truthfulness because of the Control Lemma. The next step
would be to relax these notions. There have been already a few approaches on relaxing pro-
portionality and envy-freeness under indivisible goods, leading to solutions such as themaximin
share fairness, envy-freeness up to one item [Budish, 2011], as well as the type of worst-case
guarantees proposed by Hill [1987] (recall Definitions 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 in Section 2). The fact that
a truthful mechanismX yields control of singletons does not seem to have such detrimental ef-
fects on these notions. However, if even a single pair of items is controlled by a player, the same
situation arises.
4.1.2 Control of pairs
We propose the followingnecessary (but not sufficient) condition that captures a common aspect
of all these relaxations of fairness. This allows us to treat all the above concepts of fairness in a
unified way.
5Consider, for instance, a profile where both players desire only the first item and have a negligible value for the
other items. Then one of the players will necessarily remain unsatisfied and receive a value close to zero, no matter
what the allocation is.
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Definition 4.2. We say that a mechanism X yields control of pairs if there exists i ∈ {1,2} and
S ⊆ [m] with |S| = 2, such that player i controls S with respect to X .
The following lemma states that in order to obtain impossibility results for the above con-
cepts, it is enough to focus onmechanisms with control of pairs.
Lemma 4.3. In order to achieve (either exactly or within a bounded approximation) the above
mentioned relaxed fairness criteria, a truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two play-
ers with additive valuations cannot yield control of pairs.
Proof. Assuming that {1,2} is controlled by player 1, in a setting withm items, we may consider
v′ = ([m m 1 . . . 1], [md md 1 . . . 1]), in analogy to profile v in the proof of Application 4.1. Given
that player 1 can always get both items 1 and 2 when he strongly desires them, it is easy to see
that envy-freeness up to one item cannot be achieved, while by choosing large enough d the
approximation of µ2 or V2(α2) can be arbitrarily bad.
So now we are ready to move to a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that do
not yield control of pairs. Of course such mechanisms are picking-exchange mechanisms, but
our fairness condition allows only singleton offers, and the exchange part is completely degener-
ate.
Definition 4.4. A mechanism X for allocating all the items in [m] to two players is a singleton
picking-exchange mechanism if it is a picking-exchange mechanism where for each i ∈ {1,2} at
most one of Ni and Ei is nonempty, |Ei | ≤ 1, and
Oi =
{
{{x} | x ∈Ni } when Ni 6= ;
{;} otherwise
i.e., the sets of offers contain all possible singletons.
Hence, typically, in a singleton picking-exchange mechanism player i receives from Ni ∪Ei
only his best item. Moreover, form ≥ 3, no exchanges are allowed.6
Lemma 4.5. Every truthful mechanism for allocating all the items to two players with additive
valuation functions that does not yield control of pairs can be implemented as a singleton picking-
exchange mechanism.
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Application 4.1, proving Lemma 4.5 without The-
orem 3.6 is not straightforward. In fact, it requires a partial characterization which (on a high
level) is similar to characterizing the picking component of general mechanisms.
4.2 Applications to Relaxed Notions of Fairness
It is now possible to apply Lemma 4.5 on each fairness notion separately, and characterize every
truthful mechanism that achieves each criterion.
6Theonly exceptions—and the only suchmechanismswhere bothE1 andE2 are nonempty—are twomechanisms
for the degenerate case of m = 2, e.g., N1 = N2 = ;, O1 = O2 = {;}, E1 = {a}, E2 = {b} and D = {({a}, {b})}, where
{a,b}= {1,2}.
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Envy-freeness up to one item. We start with a relaxation of envy-freeness. Below we provide a
complete description of the mechanisms that satisfy this criterion.
Application 4.6. For m ≤ 3, every singleton picking-exchange mechanism achieves envy-freeness
up to one item. For m = 4 every singleton picking-exchange mechanism with |N1| = |N2| = 2
achieves envy-freeness up to one item. Finally, for m ≥ 5 there is no truthful mechanism that allo-
cates all the items to two players and achieves envy-freeness up to one item.
Maximin share fairness and related notions. For maximin share allocations a truthful mech-
anism was suggested by Amanatidis et al. [2016] for any number of items and any number of
players. For two players, their mechanism is the singleton picking-exchange mechanism with
N1 = [m] and produces an allocation that guarantees to each player a
1
⌊m/2⌋
-approximation of
his maximin share. It was left as an open problem whether a better truthful approximation ex-
ists. Here we show that this approximation is tight; in fact, almost any other singleton picking-
exchangemechanism performs strictly worse. Note that the best previously known lower bound
for two players was 1/2.
Application 4.7. For any m there exists a singleton picking-exchange mechanism that guarantees
to player i a ⌊max{2,m}/2⌋−1-approximation of µi , for i ∈ {1,2}. There is no truthful mechanism
that allocates all the items to two players and achieves a better guarantee with respect to maximin
share fairness.
Regarding now allocations that guarantee an approximationof the functionV2(αi ) defined by
Hill [1987] (recall the definition in Section 2), the singleton picking-exchange mechanism with
N1 = [m] was also suggested byMarkakis and Psomas [2011] as a
1
⌊m/2⌋
-approximation ofV2(αi ).
7
This comes as no surprise, since there exists a strong connection between maximin shares and
the function Vn , especially for two players. This is illustrated in the following corollary, where
both the positive and the negative results coincide with the ones for the maximin share fairness.
Application 4.8. For any m there exists a singleton picking-exchange mechanism that guaran-
tees to player i a ⌊max{2,m}/2⌋−1-approximation of V2(αi ), for i ∈ {1,2}, where αi =max j∈[m] vi j .
There is no truthful mechanism that allocates all the items to two players and achieves a better
guarantee with respect to the V2(αi )s.
Again, the best previously known lower bound for two players was constant, namely 2/3 due
to Markakis and Psomas [2011]. In Applications 4.7 and 4.8, it is stated that there exists a 1
⌊m/2⌋
-
approximate singletonpicking-exchangemechanism. It is interesting that any singletonpicking-
exchange mechanism does not perform much worse. Following the corresponding proofs, we
have that even the worst singleton picking-exchangemechanism achieves a 1
m−1
-approximation
in each case.
Remark 4.9. Gourvès et al. [2015] introduced a variant of Vn , calledWn , and showed that there
always exists an allocation such that each player i receivesWn(αi )≥Vn(αi ) (where the inequality
is often strict). Since the definition of Wn is rather involved even for n = 2, we defer a formal
discussion about it to the full version of the paper. However, it is not hard to show that for every
valuation function vi we have V2(αi )≤W2(αi )≤µi and thus the analog of Application 4.8 holds.
7The approximation factor in Markakis and Psomas [2011] is expressed in terms of V2(1/m), but it simplifies to
⌊m/2⌋−1.
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Remark 4.10. Amanatidis et al. [2016] made the following interesting observation: every single
known truthful mechanism achieving a bounded approximation of maximin share fairness is
ordinal, in the sense that it only needs a ranking of the items for each player rather than his
whole valuation function. Finding truthfulmechanisms that explicitly take into account the play-
ers’ valuation functions in order to achieve better guarantees was posed as a major open prob-
lem. Note that, weird tie-breaking aside, all singleton picking-exchangemechanisms are ordinal!
Therefore, from themechanism designer’s perspective, it is impossible to exploit the extra cardi-
nal information given as input and at the same time maintain truthfulness and some nontrivial
fairness guarantee.
5 Truthful Mechanisms for Many Players
We introduce a family of non-dictatorial, truthful mechanisms for any number of players. Our
mechanisms are defined recursively; in analogy to serial dictatorships, the choices of a player
define the sub-mechanism used to allocate the items to the remaining players. Here, however,
this serial behavior is observed “in parallel” in several sets of a partition ofM .
A generalized deal between k players is a collection of (up to k(k−1)) exchange deals between
pairs of players. A set D of generalized deals is called valid if all the sets involved in all these
exchange deals are nonempty and pairwise disjoint. Given a profile v= (v1,v2, . . . ,vn) we say that
a generalized deal is favorable if it strictly improves all the players involved,while it isunfavorable
if there exists a player involved whose utility strictly decreases.
Definition 5.1. A mechanism X for allocating all the items in [m] to n players is called a serial
picking-exchange mechanism if
1. when n = 1, X always allocates the whole [m] to player 1.
2. when n ≥ 2, there exist a partition (N1, . . . ,Nn ,E1, . . . ,En) of [m], sets of offers Oi on Ni for
i ∈ [n], a valid set D of generalized deals, and a mapping f from subsets of M to serial
picking-exchange mechanisms for n−1 players, such that for every profile v = (v1, . . . ,vn)
we have for all i ∈ [n]:
• X
Ni
i
(v) ∈ argmaxS∈Oi vi (S),
• X E
i
(v), where E =
⋃
j∈[n]E j , is the result of startingwith Ei and performing some of the
deals inD, including all the favorable deals but no unfavorable ones,
• the items of Ni X
Ni
i
(v) are allocated to players in [n] {i } using the serial picking-
exchangemechanism f
(
Ni X
Ni
i
(v)
)
.
Clearly, serial picking-exchangemechanisms are a generalizationof picking-exchangemech-
anisms studied in Section 3. The following example illustrates how such a mechanism looks like
for three players.
Example 4. Suppose that we have three players with additive valuations. For simplicity, assume
that each player’s valuation induces a strict preference over all possible subsets of items. Let
M = [100] be the set of items, and consider the following relevant ingredients of our mechanism:
• N1 = {1,2, . . . ,20}, O1 = {{1,2,3},N1 {1}}
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• N2 = {21,22, . . . ,50}, O2 = {S ⊆N2 | |S| = 6}
• N3 = {51,52, . . . ,70}, O3 = {{51, . . . ,60}, {61, . . . ,70}}
• E1 = {71, . . . ,80}, E2 = {81, . . . ,90}, E3 = {91, . . . ,100}
• D =
{[
({75,79}, {83})1,3
]
,
[
({71}, {88})1,2, ({72,80}, {95})1,3, ({85}, {99,100})2,3
]}
• f is a mapping from subsets ofM to picking-exchangemechanisms (for 2 players)
The above sets are the analog of the corresponding sets of a picking-exchange mechanism. The
deals, however, are a bit more complex. E.g., by
[
({71}, {88})1,2, ({72,80}, {95})1,3, ({85}, {99,100})2,3
]
we denote the deal in which:
– player 1 gives item 71 to player 2 and items 72, 80 to player 3
– player 2 gives item 88 to player 1 and item 85 to player 3
– player 3 gives item 95 to player 1 and items 99, 100 to player 2
The mapping f suggests which truthful mechanism should be used every time there are items
left to be allocated to only two players.
We are ready to describe our mechanismX :
1. The mechanism gives endowments E1,E2,E3 to the three players and then performs each
exchange deal that strictly improves all the players involved.
2. Then, for each i ∈ {1,2,3}, the mechanism gives to player i his best set in Oi , say Si .
3. Finally, for each i ∈ {1,2,3}, X uses mechanism f (Ni Si ) to allocate the items of Ni Si to
players in {1,2,3} i .
Like picking-exchangemechanisms, serial picking-exchangemechanisms are truthful, given
an appropriate tie-breaking rule (e.g., a label-based tie-breaking rule). To bypass a general dis-
cussion about tie-breaking, however, wemay assume that each player’s valuation induces a strict
preference over all subsets of M . We denote by V 6=n,m the set of profiles that only include such
valuation functions. Following almost the same proof, however, we have that for general ad-
ditive valuations every serial picking-exchange mechanism is truthful when using label-based
tie-breaking.
Theorem 5.2. When restricted to V 6=n,m , every serial picking-exchange mechanismX for allocating
m items to n players is truthful.
The proof is similar in spirit with the proof of Theorem 3.4, and is deferred to the full version
of the paper.
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6 Discussion
We obtained a nontrivial characterization for truthfulmechanisms, that has immediate implica-
tions on fairness. A natural question to ask is whether our characterization can be extended for
more than two players. Characterizing the truthful mechanisms without money for any number
of additive players is, undoubtedly, a fundamental open problem. However, as indicated by Def-
inition 5.1, there seems to be amuch richer structurewhen one attempts to describe suchmech-
anisms, even though serial picking-exchangemechanisms are only a subset of nonbossy truthful
mechanisms. In particular, the notion of control that was crucial for identifying the structure
of truthful mechanisms for two players does not convey enough information anymore. Instead,
there seem to exist several different levels of control, and understanding this structure still re-
mains a very interesting and intriguing question.
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A MissingMaterial from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Assume X is a picking-exchange mechanism with partition (N1,N2,E1,
E2), offer setsOi on Ni , for i ∈ {1,2}, and set of exchange dealsD. Let v= (v1,v2) ∈ V
6=
m be a profile,
and fix v2. We are going to show that there is no v
′ = (v ′1,v2) ∈ V
6=
m such that v1(X1(v
′))> v1(X1(v)).
For any v′ = (v ′1,v2) ∈ V
6=
m there exist the following possibilities:
(a) X1(v
′)= X1(v). Then clearly v1(X1(v
′))= v1(X1(v)).
(b) X
N1∪N2
1 (v
′) 6= X
N1∪N2
1 (v), but X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′)= X
E1∪E2
1 (v). Then it must be the case where X
N1
1 (v
′) 6=
X
N1
1 (v). Indeed, player 1 has no power over N2 where the items that he is allocated depend only
on the unique best offer to player 2, i.e., X
N2
1 (v
′) = X
N2
1 (v). But this can only mean v1(X
N1
1 (v
′)) <
v1(X
N1
1 (v)) by the definition of a picking-exchange mechanism and the fact that there are no
subsets of equal value. So in total, v1(X1(v
′))< v1(X1(v)).
(c) X
N1∪N2
1 (v
′) = X
N1∪N2
1 (v), but X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′) 6= X
E1∪E2
1 (v). By the definition of picking-exchange
mechanisms, player 1 can never force an exchange that is good for him but not for player 2.
That is, by deviating he will lose one or more exchanges that were good for him, and/or force
one or more exchanges that were bad for him. We conclude it is the case where v1(X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′))<
v1(X
E1∪E2
1 (v)), and therefore, v1(X1(v
′))< v1(X1(v)).
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(d) X
N1∪N2
1 (v
′) 6= X
N1∪N2
1 (v), and X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′) 6= X
E1∪E2
1 (v). By the fact that we are restricted to V
6=
m ,
we can derive that the “picking part” on N1∪N2 and the “exchange part” on E1∪E2 are inde-
pendent. So, by cases (b) and (c) above we have v1(X
N1
1 (v
′)) < v1(X
N1
1 (v)) and v1(X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′)) <
v1(X
E1∪E2
1 (v)). Therefore, v1(X1(v
′))< v1(X1(v)).
We conclude that every picking-exchangemechanism on V 6=m is truthful.
Remark A.1. With only slightmodifications of the above proof, we have that for general additive
valuations every picking-exchangemechanism is truthful when using the following two interest-
ing families of tie-breaking rules:
Tie-breaking with labels. Every set in O1∪O2 has a distinct label, and whenever argmaxS∈Oi vi (S)
is not a singleton, player i receives the set with the smallest label. Further, every deal in D has a
label with five possible values, each indicating one of the following: (i) the exchange takes place
every time it is not unfavorable, (ii) it only takes place every time it is not unfavorable and at least
one player is strictly improved, (iii) it only takes place every time it is not unfavorable and player
1 is strictly improved, (iv) it only takes place every time it is not unfavorable and player 2 is strictly
improved, and (v) it only takes place every time it is favorable.
Welfare maximizing tie-breaking. When argmaxS∈Oi vi (S) is not a singleton, player i receives the
set that leaves in Ni asmuch value as possible for the other player. If there are still ties, labels are
used to resolve those. Further, for every deal in D the exchange takes place every time it is not
unfavorable and at least one player is strictly improved.
Proof of Corollary 3.10. From the definition of the Cis and Corollary 3.9, C1∪C2 = M follows.
On the other hand, if z ∈C1∩C2, then there exist a set A ∈A1, such that z ∈ A, and a set B ∈A2
such that z ∈ B . By Lemma 3.8, this implies that the singleton {z} is controlled by both players,
which is a contradiction. Thus, we haveC1∩C2 =;.
Proof of Lemma 3.11. Due to symmetry, it suffices to prove the statement for i = 1. If N1 = ;
then the statement is trivially true. So assume N1 6= ; and suppose that the statement does not
hold. That is, there exists a profile v = (v1,v2) such that for any S ∈ O1 we have X
N1
1 (v)* S. This
means X
N1
1 (v) 6= ;. Since the sets in O1 cover N1, there exists S
′ such that S ′∩ X
N1
1 (v) 6= ;. Let
Z be a maximum cardinality such intersection between some S ′ ∈ O1 and X
N1
1 (v), and x be any
element of X
N1
1 (v) Z . Note that x is guaranteed to exist since X
N1
1 (v) is not contained in any set
of O1. Also, there is no S
′′ ∈O1 such that Z ∪ {x}⊆ S
′′ due to the maximality of Z .
The generic values that may appear in v restrict our ability to argue about the allocation,
so our first goal is to reach a profile u that contradicts the lemma’s statement, like v, but has
appropriately selected values. Then, having u as a starting point we can create profiles in which
the allocations contradict truthfulness.
Now, recall that in profile v, player 1 gets Z ∪ {x} (notice that he may get more items as well),
and consider profiles v′ = (v I1,v2) and v
′′ = (v II1 ,v2), where
Z x M (Z ∪ {x})
v I1 —m
2 — m —1—
and
Z x M (Z ∪ {x})
v II1 —m — m
2 — 1—
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By truthfulness, player 1 continues to get Z ∪{x} in both cases, i.e., Z ∪{x}⊆ X
N1
1 (v
′) and Z ∪{x}⊆
X
N1
1 (v
′′).
Weproceed by changing the values of player 2 this time. Assuming thatM (Z∪{x})= {i1, i2, . . . ,
iℓ} let fi j =m if i j ∈ X2(v
′′) and fi j = 1 otherwise. Consider the next profile u= (v
II
1 ,v
I
2):
Z x M (Z ∪ {x})
v II1 —m — m
2 — 1—
v I2 —1— m
2 fi1 , . . . , fiℓ
Now notice that player 1 must get item x, since x ∈ N1 and thus he controls {x}. On the other
hand, since player 2 can not get x hemust continue to get at least the items in X2(v
′′) by truthful-
ness (otherwise he would play v2 instead). Since this the case, he can not get a strict superset of
X2(v
′′) either. Indeed, if this was not the case he would deviate from v′′ to u. So we can conclude
that X2(u)= X2(v
′′).
Now wemove to a profile u′ = (v I1,v
II
2 ) where eventually player 2 gets item x:
Z x M (Z ∪ {x})
v I1 —m
2 — m —1—
v II2 —m
2 — m2 fi1 , . . . , fiℓ
In u′, both players strongly desire Z ∪ {x}. But player 1 cannot get both set Z and item x, or by
Lemma 3.8 he controls Z ∪{x} and thus Z∪{x}⊆ S for some S ∈O1. However, he controls Z , since
there exists some S ′ ∈O1 such that Z = S
′∩X
N1
1 (v)⊆ S
′. So, player 1 has to get Z since he strongly
desires it, and item x is given to player 2 (probably with other items inM (Z ∪ {x}).
Finally, consider our final profile u′′ = (v I1,v
I
2)
Z x M (Z ∪ {x})
v II1 —m
2 — m —1—
v II2 —1— m
2 fi1 , . . . , fiℓ
By truthfulness, player 2must get item x, or he would deviate from u′′ to u′. However, now player
1 can strictly improve his utility by deviating from profile u′′ to u, something that contradicts
truthfulness.
Proof of Lemma 3.12. Due to symmetry, it suffices to prove the statement for i = 1. If N1 = ;
then the statement is trivially true. So assume N1 6= ; and suppose, towards a contradiction,
that the statement does not hold. That is, there exists a profile v = (v1,v2) such that X
N1
1 (v) ∉
argmaxS∈O1 v1(S). We consider two cases, depending on whether X
N2
2 (v) is in O2 or not. In both
cases, we create a series of deviations that eventually contradict truthfulness. Like in the proof
of Lemma 3.11, our first goal is to reach a profile u that contradicts the statement, like v, but
has appropriately selected values. Using u as a starting point we create profiles in which the
allocations dictated by truthfulness are in conflict.
Case 1. Assume X
N2
2 (v) ∈ O2 (note that this includes the case where O2 = {;}). Intuitively this is
the case where the two players trade value between N1 and E2.
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Consider the profile v′ = (v1,v
I
2), where
X
N1
1 (v) X
N1
2 (v) X
N2
1 (v) X
N2
2 (v) E1 X
E2
1 (v) X
E2
2 (v)
v I2 —m — —m
3 — —m — —m4 — — 1— —m2 — —m4 —
By truthfulness, X2(v
′)⊇ X
N1
2 (v)∪X
N2
2 (v)∪X
E2
2 (v). This implies X
N2
2 (v
′)= X
N2
2 (v) due to themax-
imality of X
N2
2 (v) and Lemma 3.11, as well as X
N1
1 (v
′) ⊆ X
N1
1 (v). The latter implies that X
N1
1 (v
′) ∉
argmaxS∈O1 v1(S).
Claim A.2. X
E2
1 (v
′) 6= ;.
Proof of Claim A.2. Suppose X
E2
1 (v
′)=; and let S ′ ∈ argmaxS∈O1 v1(S). Then player 1, whose total
received value in v′ would be strictly less than v1(S
′∪ (X
N2
1 (v))∪E1), could force the mechanism
to give him at least that by playing
S ′ N1 S
′ N2 E1 E2
v I1 —m — —1— — 1— —m — —1—
By the definition ofN1,N2, E1, and Lemma 3.11, player 1 gets S
′,N2 X
N2
2 (v), and E1 (and possibly
something from E2). Since this contradicts truthfulness, it must be the case that X
E2
1 (v
′) 6= ;. (In
fact, this settles Case 1 when E2 =;.) ⊳
Next, let S1 ∈O1 be such that X
N1
1 (v
′)⊆ S1 (they could possibly be equal). Consider the profile
u= (v II1 ,v
I
2), where
X
N1
1 (v
′) S1 X
N1
1 (v
′) N1 S1 N2 X
E1
1 (v
′) X
E1
2 (v
′) X
E2
1 (v
′) X
E2
2 (v
′)
v II1 —m — —1+m
−1 — —1— — 1— —m3 — —1— —m2 — —1—
Notice that S1 is the unique set in argmaxS∈O1 v
II
1 (S). By truthfulness, X1(u)⊇ X
N1
1 (v
′)∪X
E1
1 (v
′)∪
X
E2
1 (v
′).
Claim A.3. S1* X1(u), and therefore X
N1
1 (u) ∉ argmaxS∈O1 v
II
1 (S).
Proof of Claim A.3. Suppose S1 ⊆ X1(u). By Lemma 3.11 this means S1 = X
N1
1 (u). Then player 2,
whose total received value in u would be strictly less than v II2 ((N1 S1)∪ X
N2
2 (v
′)∪ X
E2
2 (v
′))+m,
could force the mechanism to give himmore than that by playing
N1 X
N2
1 (v
′) X
N2
2 (v
′) E1 E2
v II2 —1— — 1— —m — —1— —m —
By the definition of N2, E2, in v
′′ = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ) player 2 gets X
N2
2 (v
′) and E2 (and possibly something
from N1 and E1). Given that, the maximum value that player 1 could achieve in v
′′ is v II1 (S1∪
X
N2
1 (v
′)∪E1) and there is no subset ofM (X
N2
2 (v
′)∪E2) giving this value other than S1∪X
N2
1 (v
′)∪
E1. In fact, player 1 can achieve exactly this by increasing his reported value for each item in
S1 ∪E1 to m
3. Thus X1(v
′′) = S1 ∪ X
N2
1 (v
′)∪E1 and v
II
2 (X2(v
′′)) = v II2 ((N1 S1)∪ X
N2
2 (v
′)∪E2) ≥
v II2 ((N1 S1)∪X
N2
2 (v
′)∪X
E2
2 (v
′))+m2. Since this contradicts truthfulness, it must be the case that
S1 * X1(u) (and thus X
N1
1 (u) ∉ argmaxS∈O1 v
II
1 (S)). ⊳
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Claim A.3 implies that S1 X
N1
1 (u) 6= ;. Since the sets in O1 have empty intersection, there
must exist some T ∈O1 such that S1 X
N1
1 (u)* T . We are going to concentrate most of player 2’s
value from N1 onW = (S1 X
N1
1 (u)) T ⊆ X
N1
2 (u). Notice thatW 6= ;.
So consider the profile u′ = (v II1 ,v
III
2 ), where
N1 W W X
N2
1 (v) X
N2
2 (v) E1 X
E2
1 (v
′) X
E2
2 (v
′)
v III2 —m — —m
3 — —m — —m4 — — 1— —m2 — —m4 —
By the definition of N2, E2 and truthfulness, X2(u
′)⊇W ∪X
N2
2 (v)∪X
E2
2 (v
′).
Claim A.4. X
E2
1 (u
′) 6= ;.
Proof of Claim A.4. This is very similar to the proof of Claim A.2. Suppose X
E2
1 (u
′) = ;. Then
player 1, whose total received value in u′ would be strictly less than v II1 (S1∪ X
N2
1 (v)∪E1), could
force themechanism to give him at least that by playing
S1 N1 S1 N2 E1 E2
v III1 —m — —1— — 1— —m — —1—
Since this contradicts truthfulness, it must be the case where X
E2
1 (u
′) 6= ;. ⊳
Before we examine the final profile of the proof, let us consider the following simple profile
u′′ = (v IV1 ,v
IV
2 ):
T N1 T X
N2
1 (v) X
N2
2 (v) E1 X
E2
1 (u
′) X
E2
2 (u
′)
v IV1 —m — —1— — 1— — 1— — 1— —m
2 — —1—
v IV2 —1— — 1— — 1— —m — —1— —m — —m —
By the definition of N2, E2, in u
′′ player 2 gets X
N2
2 (v) and E2 (and possibly something from N1
and E1). Given that, themaximumvalue that player 1 could achieve in u
′′ is |T |·m+|X
N2
1 (v)∪E1|,
and there is no subset of M (X
N2
2 (v)∪E2) giving this value other than T ∪ X
N2
1 (v)∪E1. In fact,
player 1 can achieve exactly this by increasing his reported value for each item in T ∪E1 to m
3.
Thus X1(u
′′)= T ∪X
N2
1 (v)∪E1 and X2(u
′′)= (N1 T )∪X
N2
2 (v)∪E2.
The final profile we need is u′′′ = (v IV1 ,v
III
2 ), and the contradiction follows from the allocation
of the items in X
E2
1 (u
′). If X
E2
1 (u
′)* X1(u′′′) then player 1 has incentive to deviate to profile u′ =
(v II1 ,v
III
2 ). So, it must be the case where X
E2
1 (u
′) ⊆ X1(u
′′′), and therefore v III2 (X2(u
′′′)) ≤ v III2 (M
X
N2
1 (u
′))< v III2 (W ∪X
N2
2 (v)∪X
E2
2 (u
′))+m2. On the other hand, notice thatW ⊆N1 T . Using the
allocation for u′′ we derived above, by truthfulness we have that v III2 (X2(u
′′′))≥ v III2 (W ∪X
N2
2 (v)∪
E2)≥ v
III
2 (W ∪X
N2
2 (v)∪X
E2
2 (u
′))+m2, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Assume X
N2
2 (v)∉O2. Case 1 implies that not only X
N1
1 (v) ∉ argmaxS∈O1 v1(S) but X
N1
1 (v) ∉
O1. Intuitively this is the case where the two players trade value between N1 and N2. The proof
uses a sequence of profiles similar to Case 1.
Consider the profile v′ = (v1,v
I
2), where
X
N1
1 (v) X
N1
2 (v) X
N2
1 (v) X
N2
2 (v) E1 E2
v I2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —m3 — —1— — 1—
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By truthfulness, X2(v
′) ⊇ X
N1
2 (v)∪ X
N2
2 (v). This implies X
N1
1 (v
′) ⊆ X
N1
1 (v), and thus X
N1
1 (v
′) ∉ O1.
By Case 1, this means that X
N2
2 (v
′) ∉O2.
Next, let S1 ∈ O1 be a minimal set of O1 such that X
N1
1 (v
′) ⊆ S1. Since X
N1
1 (v
′) ∉ O1, we have
X
N1
1 (v
′)( S1. Consider the profile u= (v I1,v
I
2), where
X
N1
1 (v
′) S1 X
N1
1 (v
′) N1 S1 X
N2
1 (v
′) X
N2
2 (v
′) E1 E2
v I1 —m — —1+m
−1 — — 1— —m — —1— — 1— — 1—
Notice that S1 is the unique set in argmaxS∈O1 v
I
1(S). By truthfulness, X1(u)⊇ X
N1
1 (v
′)∪X
N2
1 (v
′).
Claim A.5. S1* X1(u), and therefore X
N1
1 (u) ∉ argmaxS∈O1 v
I
1(S).
Proof of Claim A.5. This is similar to the proof of Claim A.3.Suppose S1 ⊆ X1(u). By Lemma 3.11
thismeans S1 = X
N1
1 (u). Then player 2, whose total received value in uwould be strictly less than
v I2(X
N2
2 (v
′))+m, could force the mechanism to give him at least that by playing
N1 N2 S2 S2 E1 E2
v II2 —1— — 1— —m — —1— —m —
where S2 ∈ O2 is such that X
N2
2 (v
′) ⊆ S2. By the definition of N2, E2, in v
′′ = (v I1,v
II
2 ) player 2 gets
S2 and E2 (and possibly something from N1 and E1). Note, however, that X
N2
2 (v
′) ∉ O2 and thus
X
N2
2 (v
′) ( S2. Therefore, v I2(X2(v
′′)) ≥ v I2(S2) ≥ v
I
2(X
N2
2 (v
′))+m. Since this contradicts truthful-
ness, it must be the case that S1* X1(u) (and thus X
N1
1 (u) ∉ argmaxS∈O1 v
I
1(S)). ⊳
This implies that S1 X
N1
1 (u) 6= ;. Since the sets in O1 have empty intersection, there must
exist some T ∈O1 such that S1 X
N1
1 (u)* T . We are going to concentrate most of player 2’s value
from N1 onW = (S1 X
N1
1 (u)) T 6= ;. So consider the profile u
′ = (v I1,v
III
2 ), where
N1 W W X
N2
1 (u) X
N2
2 (u) E1 E2
v III2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —m3 — —1— — 1—
By truthfulness, X2(u
′) ⊇ W ∪ X
N2
2 (u). This implies that S1 * X1(u
′) and thus X
N1
1 (u
′) ∉
argmaxS∈O1 v
I
1(S). By Case 1, this means that X
N2
2 (u
′) ∉O2. Therefore, X
N2
1 (u
′) 6= ;.
Now let S ′2 ∈O2 is such that X
N2
2 (u
′)( S ′2. Before we examine the final profile of the proof, let
us consider the following profile u′′ = (v II1 ,v
IV
2 ):
T N1 T N2 S
′
2 S
′
2 X
N2
2 (u
′) X
N2
2 (u
′) E1 E2
v II1 —m — — 1— —m
2 — —m2 — — 1— — 1— — 1—
v IV2 —1— — 1— — 1— —m — —m — — 1— —m —
By the definition of N2, E2, in u
′′ player 2 gets S ′2 and E2 (and possibly something from N1 and
E1). Given that, themaximumvalue that player 1 could achieve inu
′′ is |T |·m+|N2 S
′
2|·m
2+|E1|.
In fact, player 1 can achieve exactly this by increasing his reported value for each item in T ∪E1
tom3. Thus X1(u
′′)= T ∪ (N2 S
′
2)∪E1 and X2(u
′′)= (N1 T )∪S
′
2∪E2.
The final profile we need is u′′′ = (v II1 ,v
III
2 ), and the contradiction follows from the allocation
of the items in X
N2
1 (u
′). If X
N2
1 (u
′) * X1(u′′′) then player 1 has incentive to deviate to profile
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u′ = (v I1,v
III
2 ). So, it must be the case where X
N2
1 (u
′)⊆ X1(u
′′′) and therefore v III2 (X2(u
′′′))≤ v III2 (M
X
N2
1 (u
′))< |W | ·m2+|X
N2
2 (u)| ·m
3+m. On the other hand, notice thatW ⊆N1 T and recall that
X
N2
2 (u)⊆ X
N2
2 (u
′)( S ′2. Using the allocation for u
′′ we calculated above, by truthfulness we have
that v III2 (X2(u
′′′))≥ v III2 ((N1 T )∪S
′
2)≥ |W | ·m
2+|X
N2
2 (u)| ·m
3+m, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.13. Suppose that this not true. So there are profiles v = (v1,v2),v
′ = (v ′1,v
′
2) ∈
V
6=
m such that vi j = v
′
i j
for all i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ E1∪E2, but X
E1∪E2
1 (v) 6= X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′). In such a case,
either v = (v1,v2), vˆ = (v
′
1,v2), or vˆ= (v
′
1,v2),v
′ = (v ′1,v
′
2) is also a pair of profiles that violates the
statement. Without loss of generality we assume that v, vˆ is such a pair, and that v1(X
E1
1 (v)) >
v1(X
E1
1 (vˆ)). Now let S1, Sˆ1 ∈O1 be the single best offer in each case. If S1 = Sˆ1 then player 1 would
deviate from vˆ to v and strictly improve. So assume that S1 6= Sˆ1 andmultiply the values in E1∪E2
for player 1 with a large enough constant K , so that K
(
vˆ1(X
E1
1 (v))− vˆ1(X
E1
1 (vˆ))
)
> vˆ1(N1∪N2).
Call v∗ = (v∗1 ,v2) and vˆ
∗ = (v ′∗1 ,v2) the new profiles and notice that they are still in V
6=
m . Also,
it is easy to see that truthfulness implies X1(v) = X1(v
∗) and X1(vˆ) = X1(vˆ
∗). Indeed, by Lemma
3.12, we have X
N1∪N2
1 (v)= X
N1∪N2
1 (v
∗), and if it was the case where X
E1∪E2
1 (v) 6= X
E1∪E2
1 (v
∗), then
player 1 would deviate from profile v to v∗ or vice versa to strictly improve his utility. The same
holds for vˆ to vˆ∗.
Now, however, player 1would deviate from vˆ∗ to v∗ in order to improve by at least vˆ∗1(X
E1
1 (v
∗))−
vˆ∗1 (X
E1
1 (vˆ
∗))− vˆ∗1 (N1 ∪N2) = K
(
vˆ1(X
E1
1 (v))− vˆ1(X
E1
1 (vˆ))
)
− vˆ1(N1 ∪N2) > 0, and this contradicts
truthfulness.
Remark A.6. Since we are talking about XE in many of the following proofs, it is correct to write
X
E1∪E2
i
(·), not Xi (·). For the sake of readability, though, we drop the superscript wherever it is
not necessary. Similarly, in order to avoid the unnecessary use of extra symbols, we prove the
statements form items, although in Subsection 3.2 XE is a mechanism on ℓ≤m items.
Remark A.7. For most of the following proofs we need to construct profiles in V 6=m . To facilitate
the presentation, however, the valuation functions we construct only use a few powers ofm. As
a result, the corresponding profiles typically are not in V 6=m . Still, this is without loss of generality;
when defining such valuation functionswe can add 2i/2κ to the value of item i , for i ∈ [m]. When
κ ∈ N is large enough (usually κ = m + 1 suffices), our arguments about the allocation are not
affected, and a strict preference over all subsets is induced.
Proof of Lemma 3.14. Let v = (v1,v2) ∈ Vm , and consider the intermediate profile v
∗ = (v ′1,v2)
where v ′1x =m, if x ∈ X1(v), and v
′
1x = 1 otherwise. By truthfulness, we have that X1(v
∗) = X1(v).
By defining v ′2 in a similar way (i.e., v
′
2x =m, if x ∈ X2(v), and v
′
2x = 1 otherwise), we get the profile
v′ = (v ′1,v
′
2). Again by truthfulness, we haveX (v
′)=X (v). If v∗ and v′ where defined as described
in Remark A.7, the same arguments would apply, andmoreover, v′ ∈ V 6=m .
Proof of Lemma 3.15. To show that D is indeed a valid set of exchange deals, we need to show
that for any two distinct deals (S,T ), (S ′,T ′) ∈ D we have S ∩ S ′ = T ∩T ′ = ; and S,T,S ′,T ′ are
all nonempty. The latter is straightforward due to truthfulness and the fact that all values are
positive. The former is done through the next three lemmata, the first of which states that each
minimally exchangeable set is involved in exactly one exchange deal.
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LemmaA.8. If S ⊆ E1 is a minimally exchangeable set, then there exists a unique T ⊆ E2 such that
(S,T ) is a feasible exchange.
The lemma is stated in terms of minimally exchangeable subsets of E1, but due to symmetry
it is true for all minimally exchangeable sets. This is done for the following statements as well, for
the sake of readability. The three lemmata are proved right after this proof.
It is implied that every minimally exchangeable set appears in exactly one exchange deal in
D. The second lemma, below, guarantees that minimally exchangeable sets can be exchanged
only withminimally exchangeable sets.
Lemma A.9. Let S ⊆ E1 be a minimally exchangeable set and (S,T ) be the only feasible exchange
involving S. Then T is a minimally exchangeable set as well.
The result of the two lemmata combined is thatD= {(S1,T1), (S2,T2), . . . , (Sk ,Tk)}, where S1, . . . ,
Sk ,T1, . . . ,Tk are all the minimally exchangeable sets and are all different from each other. What
is still needed is that the intersection between any two minimally exchangeable sets is always
empty. The third lemma states something stronger (that is indeed needed later in the proof of
A.12), namely that the intersection between a minimally exchangeable set and any other ex-
changeable set is always empty, unless the latter contains the former.
LemmaA.10. Let S ⊆ E1 be aminimally exchangeable set and S
′ ⊆ E1 be an exchangeable set such
that S ′∩S 6= ;. Then S ⊆ S ′.
If the intersection between any two minimally exchangeable sets was nonempty, then by
Lemma A.10 one is contained in the other, which contradicts minimality. We can conclude that
D is a valid set of exchange deals.
Proof of Lemma A.8. Suppose that this does not hold. Without loss of generality, assume that
there is some S1 ⊆ E1 and two profiles v
I = (v I1,v
I
2) and v
II = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ), such that X
E1
1 (v
I)= E1 S1 =
X
E1
1 (v
II) and X
E2
1 (v
I)= S2 6= S
′
2 = X
E2
1 (v
II).
For the sake of readability, let A = S2 S
′
2, B = S2∩S
′
2, C = S
′
2 S2, and D =M (S2∪S
′
2). Since
S2 6= S
′
2, either A 6= ; orC 6= ;. Without loss of generality, suppose that A 6= ;. Using this notation,
X1(v
I) = (E1 S1)∪ A ∪B and X2(v
I) = S1∪C ∪D, while X1(v
II) = (E1 S1)∪B ∪C and X2(v
II) =
S1∪ A∪D.
We proceed to profile vIII = (v I1,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 2:
E1 S1 S1 A B C D
v III2 — 1— —m
2 — —1— — 1— —m3 — —m3 —
Since the most valuable items of player 2 are those which he was allocated in profile vI, by truth-
fulness, he should still get them, but he should not get any other item. ThusXE (v
III)=XE (v
I).
We move to profile vIV = (v III1 ,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
E1 S1 S1 A B C D
v III1 —m
3 — —m — —m2 — — 1— — 1— — 1—
By truthfulnesswe have that player 1 must get E1 S1 and A (or else he could deviate to profile v
III
and strictly improve). Since he gets A, an exchange takes place. Due to the minimality of S1, we
can derive that player 2 receives the whole S1. In addition, player 2 continues to get D, since he
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strongly desires it andD ⊆ E2. So we can conclude that (E1 S1)∪A ⊆ X1(v
IV) and S1∪D ⊆ X2(v
IV),
while we do not care about the allocation of the remaining items.
Now let us return to profile vII = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ). Starting from here, we change the values of player 2
and to get profile vV = (v II1 ,v
IV
2 ).
E1 S1 S1 A B C D
v IV2 —1— —m — —m
2 — —1— — 1— —m2 —
By truthfulness, like in profile vIII, we have XE (v
V)=XE (v
II).
Next, we proceed to profile vVI = (v IV1 ,v
IV
2 ), where
E1 S1 S1 A B C D
v IV1 —m
4 — —m — —m3 — —m2 — —m2 — — 1—
Player 2 continues to get A,D since he strongly desires them and A,D ⊆ E2. By the same argu-
ment, player 1 gets E1 S1. Additionally, we know that an exchange happens (otherwise player 1
would deviate to profile vV in order to get the items of B∪C ), so player 2 gets set thewhole S1 due
to its minimality. Thus we can conclude that X1(v
VI)= (E1 S1)∪B ∪C and X2(v
VI)= S1∪ A∪D.
Next, we move to profile vVII = (v IV1 ,v
V
2) by changing player 2 this time:
E1 S1 S1 A B C D
v V2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —1— — 1— —m3 —
By truthfulness, the allocation does not change, i.e., X1(v
VII) = (E1 S1)∪B ∪C and X2(v
VII) =
S1∪ A∪D.
Finally, wemove to profile vVIII = (v III1 ,v
V
2) by changing the values of player 1 back to the values
that he had in profile vIV. Now recall that X2(v
IV) ⊇ S1∪D. Since in this profile S1∪D contains
player 2’s most valuable items, he must continue to get them by truthfulness. This means that
there is an exchange. Player 1 however must get some items from A in any exchange; if not
he can declare that he strongly desires E1 and strictly improve. This, however, contradicts the
truthfulness of the mechanism, since player 1 can deviate from vVII to vVIII and become strictly
better.
Proof of Lemma A.9. Suppose that this does not hold, i.e., there exists someminimally exchange-
able S1 ∈ E1, such that (S1,S2) is the only feasible exchange involving S1, but S2 is not minimally
exchangeable. So there exists S ′2 ⊆ S2 that is minimally exchangeable. So let S
′
1 be such that
(S ′1,S
′
2) is a feasible exchange (notice that S1 6= S
′
1 by lemma A.8).
For the sake of readability, let A = E1 (S1∪S
′
1), B = S
′
1∩S1,C = S1 S
′
1,D = S2∩S
′
2, E = S
′
2, and
F = S2 S
′
2.
So there is a profile vI = (v I1,v
I
2), where X1(v
I)= (E1 S1)∪S2 = A∪B ∪E ∪F and X2(v
I)= (E2
S2)∪S1 =C∪D∪(E2 S2). Also there is another profile v
II = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ) where X1(v
II)= (E1 S
′
1)∪S
′
2 =
A∪D ∪E and X2(v
II)= (E2 S
′
2)∪S
′
1 =B ∪C ∪F ∪ (E2 S2).
We start from profile vI = (v I1,v
I
2) and we proceed to profile v
III = (v III1 ,v
I
2) by changing the
values of player 1:
A B C D E F E2 S2
v III1 —m
4 — —m4 — —m — —m — —m3 — —m2 — —1—
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Since player’s 1 most valuable items are those he was allocated in profile vI, due to the truthful-
ness of themechanism, hemust continue to get themwhile not getting any other item. Thus the
allocation does not change, i.e., X1(v
III)= A∪B ∪E ∪F and X2(v
III)=C ∪D ∪ (E2 S2).
Next, move to profile vIV = (v III1 ,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 2:
A B C D E F E2 S2
v III2 —m — —m
4 — —m — —m3 — —1— —m2 — —m5 —
Player 2 must get E2 S2 since he strongly desires them and E2 S2 ⊆ E2. Similarly, player 1 gets
A∪B . Moreover, we know that an exchange should take place (otherwise player 2 would deviate
to vIII and become strictly better). What can be exchanged from E1 is a subset of C ∪D, and
since C ∪D = S1 is minimal, it is exchanged with S2 = E ∪F (the only set that is exchangeable
with S1, by Lemma A.8). Thus we conclude that the allocation here is X1(v
IV)= A∪B ∪E ∪F and
X2(v
IV)=C ∪D ∪ (E2 S2).
Finally we move to profile vV = (v IV1 ,v
III
2 ), by changing the values of player 1:
A B C D E F E2 S2
v IV1 —m
4 — —m2 — —m — —m — —m3 — —m2 — —1—
By truthfulness, like above, the allocationdoes not change, i.e., X1(v
V)= A∪B∪E∪F and X2(v
V)=
C ∪D ∪ (E2 S2).
Now let us return to profile vII = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ). Starting from this profile we change the values of
player 2 to get profile vVI = (v II1 ,v
IV
2 ).
A B C D E F E2 S2
v IV2 — 1— —m
3 — —1— — 1— —m— —m2 — —m4 —
Player 2 must get (at least) B ∪F ∪ (E2 S2) since else he could deviate to profile v
II and become
strictly better. Now since player 1 loses B we know that an exchange takes place with some of the
available items inE . By theminimalityof E = S ′2, player 1 gets thewhole E and he losesB∪C = S
′
1.
Thus we can conclude that the allocation here is X1(v
VI)= A∪D∪E , X2(v
VI)=B∪C∪F∪(E2 S2).
In order to conclude, we move to profile vVII = (v IV1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 1
back to what he played in vV,
A B C D E F E2 S2
v IV1 —m
4 — —m2 — —m — —m — —m3 — —m2 — —1—
v IV2 —1— —m
3 — —1— — 1— —m— —m2 — —m4 —
Player 2 gets E2 S2 because he strongly desires it. We also know that an exchange should take
place, otherwise player 1 would deviate to vVI and strictly improve his total value. As a result,
player 2 gets at least one item from set B , or he could increase tom4 his value for any item in E2
and improve by getting E2. However, now player 2 can deviate from profile v
V to vVII and become
strictly better, something that contradicts the truthfulness of the mechanism.
Proof of Lemma A.10. Suppose that this does not hold, i.e., there exists a minimally exchange-
able set S1 ∈ E1 and an exchangeable set S
′
1 ∈ E1, such that S1∩S
′
1 6= ; and S1 * S
′
1. Choose S
′
1 to
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be minimal, i.e., if S ′′1 ( S
′
1 then either S1∩S
′′
1 = ; or S
′′
1 is not exchangeable. Let S2,S
′
2 be such
that (S1,S2), (S
′
1,S
′
2) are feasible exchanges and S
′
2 is minimal in the sense that there is no S
′′
2 ( S
′
2
where (S ′1,S
′′
2) being a feasible exchange. From Lemmata A.8 and A.9 we have that S
′
2 S2 6= ;.
For the sake of readability, let A = E1 (S1∪S
′
1), B = S
′
1 S1,C = S
′
1∩S1,D = S1 S
′
1, E = S2∩S
′
2,
F = S2 S
′
2,G = E2 (S2∪S
′
2), and H = S
′
2 S2.
So there is a profile vI = (E1 S1)∪S2 = (v
I
1,v
I
2), where X1(v
I)= A∪B∪E∪F , X2(v
I)= (E2 S2)∪
S1 =C∪D∪G∪H . There is also a profile v
II = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ), where X1(v
II)= (E1 S
′
1)∪S
′
2 = A∪D∪E∪H ,
X2(v
II)= (E2 S
′
2)∪S
′
1 =B ∪C ∪F ∪G .
We start from profile vI = (v I1,v
I
2) and we proceed to profile v
III = (v I1,v
III
2 ) by changing the
values of player 2:
A B C D E F G H
v III2 — 1— — 1— —m — —m — —1— — 1— —m
2 — —m2 —
By truthfulness, we can conclude that the allocation remains the same, i.e., player 1 gets A∪B ∪
E ∪F , while player 2 getsC ∪D ∪G ∪H .
Next, we move to profile vIV = (v III1 ,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
A B C D E F G H
v III1 —m
3 — —m3 — —1— — 1— —m2 — —m2 — —1— —m —
Again, by truthfulness player 1 gets A∪B ∪E ∪F , and player 2 getsC ∪D ∪G ∪H .
We continue bymoving to profile vV = (v III1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 2:
A B C D E F G H
v IV2 — 1— —m — —m
3 — — 1— — 1— —m2 — —m4 — — 1—
Player 2must getG since he strongly desires it and H ⊆ E2. The same goes for player 1 and A∪B .
Now we know that an exchange should take place, otherwise player 2 would deviate to vIII and
become strictly better. Since the only available exchangeable set here isC ∪D = S1 (because it is
minimal), it is exchanged with set S2 = E ∪F (the only set exchangeable with S1 by lemma A.8).
Thus we conclude that the allocation remains the same, player 1 gets A∪B ∪E ∪F , while player
2 getsC ∪D ∪G ∪H .
Next proceed to profile vVI = (v IV1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
A B C D E F G H
v IV1 —m
4 — —m — —1— — 1— —m2 — —m3 — —1— —m2 —
we can derive by truthfulness that player 1 must get (at least) A∪F , or else he would deviate to
profile vV and improve. Currently, this is all what we need to know for vVI.
Now let us return to profile vII = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ). Starting from here we change the values of player 1
to get profile vVII = (v V1 ,v
II
2 ).
A B C D E F G H
v V1 —m
2 — —1— — 1— —m2 — —m — —1— — 1— —m —
By truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., player 1 gets A∪D ∪E ∪H , while player 2
gets B ∪C ∪F ∪G .
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We nowmove to profile vVIII = (v V1 ,v
V
2) and change the values of player 2.
A B C D E F G H
v V2 —1— — αm
3 — — αm4 — —1— —m4 — —m5 — —m5 — —m4 —
The values in B ∪C are set in such a way so that v V2(B ∪C )> v
V
2(E ∪H), but v
V
2 (T )< v
V
2(E ∪H) for
any T ( B ∪C .8
Notice that player 2 must get G ∪F since he strongly desires it. The same goes for player 1
and A∪D. We know that an exchange should take place, otherwise player 2 would deviate to vVII
and improve. In this exchange, values are such that player 2 should get the whole S ′1. Thus we
conclude that the allocation remains the same, i.e., player 1 gets A∪D∪E∪H , while player 2 gets
B ∪C ∪F ∪G .
We nowmove to profile vIX = (v VI1 ,v
V
2 ) and change the values of player 1.
A B C D E F G H
v VI1 —m
4 — —m — — 1— —m4 — —m2 — —m3 — —1— —m2 —
Again player 2 must getG∪F . Given that, player 1 gets at least A∪D∪E∪H , and by truthfulness
he cannot receive strictly more items. Therefore, the allocation remains the same, i.e., player 1
gets A∪D ∪E ∪H , while player 2 gets B ∪C ∪F ∪G .
We now move to profile vX = (v IV1 ,v
V
2) by changing the values of player 1 back to what he had
at profile vVI. Recall:
A B C D E F G H
v IV1 —m
4 — —m — —1— — 1— —m2 — —m3 — —1— —m2 —
Like above Player 2 gets F ∪G . The same goes for player 1 A. By truthfulness, an exchange must
happen and player 1 gets at least the set E ∪H (else he would deviate to vIX and improve). More-
over, since player 2 loses E ∪H he must at least get the set B ∪C . We conclude that player 1 gets
A∪E ∪H , player 2 gets B ∪C ∪F ∪G , while we do not care what happens for items inD.
Now notice that player 2 can deviate from profile vVI to profile vX and become strictly bet-
ter (recall that at profile vVI player 2 loses G , while A,D,E ,H all have very small value) and this
contradicts truthfulness.
Proof of Lemma 3.16. We begin with a direct implication of the Lemmata A.8–A.10. Although
we are not guaranteed yet that any feasible exchange can be expressed as a union of exchange
deals from D as it should, the following corollary is a step towards this direction. Recall that
S1, . . . ,Sk and T1, . . . ,Tk are all the minimally exchangeable subsets of E1 and E2 respectively, and
that (Si ,Ti ) is the only feasible exchange involving either one of Si and Ti , for every i ∈ [k].
Corollary A.11. For every exchangeable set S ⊆ E1, we have that S =W ∪
⋃
i∈I Si , where I ⊆ [k]with
|I | ≥ 1, while W = S
⋃
i∈I Si does not contain any minimally exchangeable sets. Furthermore, this
decomposition is unique.
8This is always possible. In particular, if |B | > 0 then α= |E∪H |m
4−m
(|B |−1)m3+|C |m4
works. If |B | = 0, then α= |E∪H |m
4−m
(|C |−1)m4
. In
order to apply the idea mentioned in Remark A.7, one canmultiply the whole profile with the denominator of α.
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Ideally, we would like two things. First, theW part in the above decomposition to always be
empty, i.e., we want every exchangeable set to be a union ofminimally exchangeable sets (umes
for short). Second, we want every umes of E1 to be exchangeable only with the corresponding
umes of E2, and vice versa. To be more precise, we say that an umes S =
⋃
i∈I Si is nice if it is
exchangeable with T =
⋃
i∈I Ti and only with T . The definition of a nice umes of E2 is symmetric.
As it turns out, every umes is nice, but it takes a rather involved induction to prove it. Especially
the fact that
(⋃
i∈I Si ,
⋃
i∈I Ti
)
is exchangeable needs a carefully constructed argument about the
value that each player must gain from any exchange (see also Lemma A.14).
LemmaA.12. Every umes is nice.
Given the above lemma, we can now show that the setW in the decomposition of Corollary
A.11 is always empty. In fact the proof idea is the same as the one for Lemmata A.8–A.10.
LemmaA.13. Every exchangeable set is an umes.
The above two lemmata complete the proof. They are proved below, right after Lemma A.14.
For the following lemmas, recall that umes is short for union ofminimally exchangeable sets!
Lemma A.14. Let (S,T ) be a feasible exchange such that S is a nice umes with the property that if
S ′ ⊆ S is exchangeable, then S ′ is a nice umes. In particular, let S =
⋃
i∈[r ]Si , where Si is minimally
exchangeable for all i ∈ [r ]. If v is a profile where (Si ,Ti ) is favorable for all i ∈ [r ] then (S,T ) gives
a lower bound on the value gained from exchanges in profile v for each player.
Proof of Lemma A.14. Due to symmetry, it suffices to prove the lower bound for player 1. Let
v = (v1,v2) be a profile like in the statement, where the values are vi1,vi2, ...,vim for i = 1,2..
Since (S,T ) is a feasible exchange, there exists a profile vI = (v I1,v
I
2) ∈ V
6=
m such that the exchange
(S,T ) takes place, i.e.,X1(v
I) = (E1 S)∪T and X2(v
I) = S ∪ (E2 T ). Starting from this profile we
will use a series of intermediate profiles in order to reach v = (v1,v2). Initially consider profile
vII = (v II1 ,v
I
2) where we change the values of player 1.
v II1 j =


m·maxi v1i
mini v1i
·v1 j if j ∈ E1 S
v1 j if j ∈ S∪T
mini v1i
m·maxi v1i
·v1 j otherwise
In this profile each item in E1 S has a value which is higher from the sum of the values in all the
other sets. On the other hand, items in E2 T have total value less than the value of a single item
in the other sets.9 Since this is the case, player 1 must get E1 S since he strongly desires it. In
addition, an exchangemust take place, or player 1 could deviate to profile vI and become strictly
better. Thus an exchange takes place and must involve a subset S ′ of S. Now if S ′ was a proper
subset of S, then it would be a nice umes, i.e., S ′ =
⋃
j∈I S j , I ( [r ], and it is exchanged only with
T ′ =
⋃
j∈I T j . However, since exchanges S j ,T j , j ∈ [r ] I are also favorable, player 1 would deviate
to profile vI and become strictly better. Therefore, the exchange involves the whole S, and since
S is a nice umes it should be exchanged with T . So the allocation here is X1(v
II) = (E1 S)∪T ,
X2(v
II)= S∪ (E2 T ).
9Notice that the values are chosen in a way such that if v ∈ V 6=m , then v
I ∈ V
6=
m as well.
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By moving to profile vIII = (v II1 ,v2) where we change the values of player 2, we have that, once
again, player 1 must get the items in E1 S. Moreover, an exchange must take place, or player 2
could deviate to profile vII and become strictly better (recall that he prefers S from T ). By follow-
ing the same arguments as in the previous case, if the exchange involves a proper subset of S,
player 2 would deviate to profile vII and become strictly better. Hence player 2 gets the whole S,
i.e., the allocation here is again X1(v
III)= (E1 S)∪T and X2(v
III)= S∪ (E2 T ).
Finally we move to profile v= (v1,v2) by changing the values of player 1. It is easy to see that
if there is no exchange that improves player 1 by at least v1(T )− v1(S), then he could deviate to
profile vIII = (v II1 ,v2) and gain exactly that.
Proof of Lemma A.12. Wewill use induction in the number ofminimally exchangeable sets con-
tained in an umes; let us call this number index of the umes. Lemmata A.8 and A.9 imply that
every umes of index 1 is nice. That is the basis of our induction.
Assume that every umes of index lower or equal to k is nice and notice that Lemma A.10
implies that every exchangeable subset of an umes is also an umes.
Let S be an umes of index k + 1. In particular, let S =
⋃
i∈[k+1]Si , where for any i ∈ [k + 1]
we have that Si is minimally exchangeable and (Si ,Ti ) is a feasible exchange. By the inductive
hypothesis we have that both S1 and S
′ =
⋃k+1
i=2
Si are nice umes and uniquely exchangeable with
S1 and T
′ =
⋃k+1
i=2
Ti respectively.
We first prove that (S,T ) is a feasible exchange. Consider the following profile v= (v1,v2),
E1 (S
′
∪S1) S
′ S1 T
′ T1 E2 (T
′
∪T1)
v1 — ∆— — δ— — ǫ— —1— — ζ— — δ—
v2 — δ— — n j — — 1— — θ j — — δ— — ∆—
where∆>> 1>> ζ,n j ,θ j ,ǫ>> δ>>λi .
10 Regarding the rest values, |T1|·ζ= |S1|·ǫ+λ1 and for all
j ∈ [k+1] {1} we have that |S j |·n j = |T j |·θ j+λ j . Now notice that S
′ is a nice umes such that every
exchangeable S ′′ ⊆ S ′ is a nice umes and for all j , (S j ,T j ) is a favorable exchange with respect to
v. Lemma A.14 guarantees that in v, player 1 gains at least v1(T
′)− v1(S
′) = |T ′|−δ|S ′| from the
exchanges. So player 1 gets a superset of T ′, i.e., T ′ ⊆ X
E2
1 (v). By lemma A.10, this means that
X
E2
1 (v) is either T
′ or T .
On the other hand, if we apply lemmaA.14 for (S1,T1) we have that in profile v, player 2 should
gain at least v2(S1)− v2(T1) = |S1|−δ|T1| from the exchanges. So, X
E1
2 (v) ⊇ S1. Since T
′ is nice,
however, we have that X
E2
1 (v)= T
′ implies X
E1
2 (v)= S
′+ S1. Therefore, it must be the case where
X
E2
1 (v))T
′ or else player 2 does not get enough value.
We conclude that X
E1
2 (v) = T . Now we claim that X
E1
2 (v) = S and therefore (S,T ) is a feasible
exchange. Indeed, every S ′′( S that is exchangeable is an umes of index lower or equal to k and
therefore is nice. So S ′′,T cannot be a feasible exchange, due to the fact that S ′′ has a unique pair
T ′′( T .
Next we show that there is no Tˆ 6= T such that (S, Tˆ ) is a feasible exchange. By the proof so far
we have that if such a Tˆ existed, then it is not a subset of T . So suppose that there is a Tˆ 6= T such
that (S, Tˆ )is a feasible exchange and let T ∗ be a minimal such set (that is, if R ( T ∗ then (S,R) is
not a feasible exchange or R ⊆ T ).
10In order to be able to apply the idea mentioned in Remark A.7, one can usem7 instead of 1, and ∆=m8, δ=m3,
λi = |Ti | · |Si |, ni = |T j | ·m
4, θi = |S j | · (m
4−1), ζ= |S1| ·m
4, and ǫ= |T1| · (m
4−1).
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Thus there are twoprofiles vI = (v I1,v
I
2) and v
II = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ) wherewehave that X
E1(vI)= (E1 S)=
X
E1
1 (v
II) and X
E2
1 (v
I)= T ∗ 6= T = X
E2
1 (v
II).
For the sake of readability, let A = T ∗ T , B = T ∗∩T ,C = T T ∗,D = E2 (T
∗∪T ).
We start from profile vI where the allocation is X1(v
I)= (E1 S)∪ A∪B , X2(v
I)= S∪C ∪D and
we proceed to profile vIII = (v I1,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 2:
E1 S S A B C D
v III2 —1— —m — —1— — 1— —m
2 — —m2 —
By truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
III)= (E1 S)∪A∪B , X2(v
III)= S∪C∪D.
Next we move to profile vIV = (v III1 ,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
E1 S S A B C D
v III1 —m
3 — —m — —m2 — — 1— — 1— — 1—
Notice that player 1must receive E1 S since he strongly desires it. The same goes for player 2 and
C ∪D. Now we know that an exchange should take place and that in this exchange player 1 must
get at least set A = T ∗ T (otherwise he would deviate to vIII and become strictly better).
We claim that player 1 gets the whole T ∗. If this was not the case then he would get some set
R ⊇ A 6= ;. Since R ( T ∗ and R * T we have that the exchange (S,R) is not feasible due to the
minimality of T ∗. Thus R is exchanged with some Sˆ ( S. However Sˆ is an umes (by Lemma A.8)
and by inductive hypothesis it is exchangeable only with strict subsets of T which is a contradic-
tion. Similarly, player 2 must get set the whole S, or otherwise he would get some Sˆ ( S which is
exchangeable only with strict subsets of T , something that can not happen. Thus the allocation
here is X1(v
IV)= (E1 S)∪ A∪B , X2(v
IV)= S∪C ∪D.
Next we move to profile vV = (v III1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 2.
E1 S S A B C D
v IV2 —1— —m
2 — —1— — 1— —m — —m3 —
By truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
V)= (E1 S)∪ A∪B , X2(v
V)= S∪C ∪D.
Now let us return to profile vII = (vII1 ,v
II
2 ). Starting from this profile we change the values of
player 2 and get profile vVI = (v II1 ,v
V
2).
E1 S S A B C D
v V2 —1— —m — —m
2 — —1— — 1— —m2 —
Since player’s 2 most valuable items are those which he was allocated in profile vII, by truthful-
ness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
VI)= (E1 S)∪B ∪C , X2(v
VI)= S∪ A∪D.
Next we move to profile vVII = (v IV1 ,v
V
2) by changing the values of player 1.
E1 S S A B C D
v IV1 —m
4 — —m — —m3 — —m2 — —m2 — — 1—
Notice that player 1 must get E1 S since he strongly desires it. The same goes for player 2 and
A ∪D. Given that, an exchange takes place and in this exchange player 1 must get the whole
B ∪C = T (otherwise he would deviate to vV and strictly improve). On the other hand, player
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2 must get the whole S, or player 1 would deviate from vV to vVI and strictly improve. Thus the
allocation here remains the same: X1(v
VII)= (E1 S)∪B ∪C , X2(v
VII)= S∪ A∪D.
Next we move to profile vVIII = (v IV1 ,v
VI
2 ) by changing the values of player 2.
E1 S S A B C D
v VI2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —1— — 1— —m3 —
By truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
VIII)= (E1 S)∪B∪C , X2(v
VIII)= S∪A∪D.
Finally we move to profile vIX = (v III1 ,v
VI
2 ) by changing the values of player 1 back to what he
had in profile vV. Recall:
E1 S S A B C D
v III1 —m
3 — —m — —m2 — — 1— — 1— — 1—
Notice that player 1 must get E1 S since he strongly desires it. The same goes for player 2 and
D. Now if player 1 gets nothing from set A then there is no exchange at all. However, in this case
player 2 would deviate to profile vV and become strictly better. Thus player 1 should get at least
one item from A. As a result, however, player 1 would deviate from profile vVIII to vIX and become
strictly better, something that leads to contradiction.
This completes the inductive step.
Proof of Lemma A.13. Let S be an exchangeable subset of E1. Then according to corollary A.11
S =
⋃
i∈I Si ∪W for some I ⊆ [k], with |I | ≥ 1. We are going to show that W = ;. So suppose,
towards a contradiction, thatW 6= ;. In fact, choose S so that it is a minimal exchangeable non-
umes subset of E1, i.e., for all S
′ ( S, S ′ is either umes or non-exchangeable. In addition, notice
thatW does not contain any exchangeable sets.
Let T be such that (S,T ) is a feasible exchange. In fact let T be a minimal such set, i.e., for
all T ′ ( T , either (S,T ′) is not a feasible exchange or T ′ is not exchangeable at all. Finally, let
S∗ =
⋃
i∈I Si , T
∗ =
⋃
i∈I Ti and notice that T T
∗ 6= ; since otherwise T would be an umes (as an
exchangeable subset of an umes, by Lemma A.10).
For the sake of readability, let A = E1 S, B = T T
∗,C = T ∗∩T ,D = T ∗ T , and E = E2 (T∪T
∗).
So there are two profiles, vI = (v I1,v
I
2) where X1(v
I) = A∪B ∪C , X2(v
I) = S ∪D ∪E and vII =
(v II1 ,v
II
2 ) where X1(v
II)= A∪W ∪C ∪D and X2(v
II)= S∗∪B ∪E .
We start from profile vI = (v I1,v
I
2) and we proceed to profile v
III = (v I1,v
III
2 ) by changing the
values of player 2:
A S∗ W B C D E
v III2 — 1— —m
2 — —m2 — —1— — 1— —m3 — —m3 —
Since player’s 2most valuable items are thosewhich hewas allocated in profile vI, by truthfulness,
the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
III)= A∪B ∪C , X2(v
III)= S∪D ∪E .
Next we move to profile vIV = (v III1 ,v
III
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
A S∗ W B C D E
v III1 —m
3 — —m — —m — —m2 — —1— — 1— — 1—
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Now notice that player 1 must get A since he strongly desires it. The same goes for player 2 and
D ∪E . Also we know that an exchange should take place and that in this exchange player 1 must
get at least B = T T ∗ (otherwise he would deviate to vIII).
We claim that player 1 gets the whole T . If this was not the case then he would get some set
R ⊇B 6= ;. Since R (T and R * T ∗ we have that the exchange (S,R) is not feasible due to the fact
that T is minimal. Thus R should be exchanged with some Sˆ ( S. However, by the minimality
of S, Sˆ is an umes and it is exchangeable only with strict subsets of T ∗, which is a contradiction.
On the other hand, player 2 must get the whole S, or otherwise he would get some Sˆ( S which is
exchangeable only with strict subsets of T ∗, something that can not happen. Thus the allocation
is X1(v
IV)= A∪B ∪C and X2(v
IV)= S∪D ∪E .
Next we move to profile vV = (v III1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 2:
A S∗ W B C D E
v III2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —1— — 1— —m2 — —m3 —
Since player’s 2 most valuable items are those which he was allocated in profile vIV, by the truth-
fulness of themechanism, hemust continue to get them but he can not get any other item. Thus
the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
V)= A∪B ∪C , X2(v
V)= S∪D ∪E .
Now let us return to profile vII = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ). Starting from this profile we change the values of
player 2 and get profile vVI = (v II1 ,v
IV
2 ):
A S∗ W B C D E
v IV2 —1— —m
2 — —m — —m4 — —1— — 1— —m4 —
Again, player’s 2 most valuable items are those which he was allocated in profile vII. So, by truth-
fulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
VI)= A∪W ∪C ∪D and X2(v
VI)= S∗∪B ∪E .
Next we move to profile vVII = (v IV1 ,v
IV
2 ) by changing the values of player 1:
A S∗ W B C D E
v IV1 —m
5 — —m — —m2 — —m4 — —m3 — —m3 — — 1—
Notice that player 1 must get A and player 2 must get B ∪E . Given that, player 1 must getW ∪
C ∪D = (otherwise he could deviate to vV and strictly improve). Thus the allocation remains the
same, i.e., X1(v
VII)= A∪W ∪C ∪D and X2(v
VII)= S∗∪B ∪E .
Next we move to profile vVIII = (v IV1 ,v
V
2) by changing the values of player 2:
A S∗ W B C D E
v V2 —1— —m
3 — —m — —m2 — —1— — 1— —m4 —
Again, by truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
VIII)= A∪W∪C∪D and X2(v
VIII)=
S∗∪B ∪E .
Finally we move to profile vIX = (v III1 ,v
V
2) by changing the values of player 1 back to what he
had in profile vV.
A S∗ W B C D E
v III1 —m
3 — —m — —m — —m2 — —1— — 1— — 1—
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Player 1 must get A and player 2 must get E . Now if player 1 gets nothing from B then there will
be no exchange. However, in this case player 2 would deviate to profile vV and become strictly
better. Thus player 1 should get at least one item from B . As a result, player 1 would deviate from
profile vVIII to vIX and strictly improve, something that leads to contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.17. Without loss of generality, assume that (S1,T1), ..., (Sr ,Tr ) is the set of all
favorable exchanges. Then (S,T ) where S =
⋃
i∈[r ]Si and T =
⋃
i∈[r ]Ti will give a lower bound on
the value of each player. Indeed, S is an umes an using Lemmata A.14 and A.12, we have that
player 1 should gain at least v1(T )− v1(S), while player 2 should gain at least v2(S)− v2(T ) from
the exchanges.
Since v ∈ V 6=m , it suffices to show that v1(X1(v)) = v1((E1∪T ) S) = v1(E1)+ v1(T )− v1(S). So
suppose that v1(X1(v)) > v1(E1)+ v1(T )− v1(S) and notice that this also implies that v2(X2(v))>
v2(E2)+v2(S)−v2(T ), since otherwise it would be v2(X2(v))= v2(E2)+v2(S)−v2(T ) and we have
the desired allocation.
As a result, there exists some S∗ ⊆ X
E1
2 (v), such that S
∗ is an umes but (S∗,T ∗)—where T ∗ is
the “pair” of S∗—is unfavorable. Without loss of generality, we may assume that v1(T
∗)< v1(S
∗).
Now let S ′ to be the union of all minimally exchangeable sets S j ⊆ X
E1
2 (v) such that v1(T j ) <
v1(S j ), and notice that S
′( X E12 (v) and v1(T
′)< v1(S
′).
Let S∗ = X
E1
2 (v) and T
∗ = X
E2
1 (v). We begin with profile v = (v1,v2) where the allocation is
X1(v)= (E1 S
∗)∪T ∗ and X2(v)= (E2 T
∗)∪S∗ and we move to profile v′ = (v1,v
′
2).
E1 S
∗ S∗ T ∗ E2 T
∗
v ′2 —1— —m — —1— —m—
By truthfulness, the allocation remains the same, i.e., X1(v
′)= (E1 S
∗)∪T ∗ and X2(v
′)= (E2 T
∗)∪
S∗.
However, now notice that (S∗ S ′,T ∗ T ′) is a favorable exchange with respect to v′. Moreover,
for everyminimally exchangeable set Si ⊆ S
∗ S ′ it holds that (Si ,Ti ) is favorable. By using lemma
A.14 we have that the gain from the exchange in v′ for player 1must be at least v1(T
∗ T ′)−v1(S
∗
S ′)> v1(T
∗)−v1(S
∗) so we arrive at a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.18. Let v = (v1,v2) be a profile in Vm . By Lemmata 3.14 and A.13, we know
that X
E1∪E2
1 (v) is the result of some exchanges of D taking place, i.e., X
E1∪E2
1 (v) = (E1
⋃
i∈I Si )∪⋃
i∈I Ti , where I ⊆ [k]. There are two things that can go wrong: either there exists some x ∈ I such
that (Sx ,Tx) is unfavorable, or there exists some z ∈ [k] I such that (Sz ,Tz) is favorable. We first
examine the former case.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that v1(Tx) < v1(Sx). Consider the profile v
′ =
(v1,v
I
2) where
v I2 j =
{
m+2 j−m−1 if j ∈ X2(v)
1+2 j−m−1 otherwise
By truthfulness, X2(v
′) = X2(v). Note also that v
I
2 induces for player 2 a strict preference over all
subsets (see also Remark A.7). Moreover, with respect to v I2 the set of “good” minimal exchanges
is exactly {(Si ,Ti ) | i ∈ I }.
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We now claim that player 1 can deviate and strictly improve his utility, thus contradicting
truthfulness. In particular, consider the profile v′′ = (v I1,v
I
2) where
v I1 j =
{
m+2 j−m−1 if j ∈ (X1(v
′)∪Sx) Tx
1+2 j−m−1 otherwise
Again, v I1 induces for player 1 a strict preference over all subsets, and thus v
′′ ∈ V
6=
m . As a result,
argmaxS∈Oi v
I
i
(S) only contains X
Ni
i
(v), for i ∈ {1,2}, and by Lemma 3.12 we have X
N1∪N2
1 (v
′′) =
X
N1∪N2
1 (v
′). Additionally, notice that with respect to v′′ the set of favorable minimal exchanges
is {(Si ,Ti ) | i ∈ I {x}}. So, by Lemma 3.17 we have X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′′) =
(
E1
⋃
i∈I {x} Si
)
∪
⋃
i∈I {x}Ti =
(X
E1∪E2
1 (v
′)∪Sx) Tx .
So, by deviating from v′ to v′′, player 1 improves his utility by v1(Sx)− v1(Tx)> 0, which con-
tradicts truthfulness. We conclude that there is no x ∈ I such that (Sx ,Tx) is unfavorable with
respect to v.
Next, we move on to the second case, i.e., there exists some z ∈ [k] I such that (Sz ,Tz) is
favorable with respect to v. Like in the first case, the valuation functions that we define induce
strict preferences over all subsets. Consider the profileQ = (v II1 ,v2) where
v II1 j =


m2+2 j−m−1 if j ∈ X1(v) Sz
m+2 j−m−1 if j ∈Tz
1+2 j−m−1 otherwise
We know, by Lemmata 3.14 and A.13, that X
E1∪E2
1 (Q) =
(
E1
⋃
i∈J Si
)
∪
⋃
i∈J Ti for some J ⊆ [k].
By truthfulness, X
N1∪N2
1 (Q) ⊇ X
N1∪N2
1 (v). In fact, by Lemma 3.12, it must be the case where
X
N1∪N2
1 (Q)= X
N1∪N2
1 (v). Again by truthfulness, X
E1
1 (Q)⊇ X
E1
1 (v) Sz = E1
⋃
i∈I∪{z}Si and X
E2
1 (Q)⊇
X
E2
1 (v)=
⋃
i∈I∪{z}Ti . This implies that I ⊆ J ⊆ I ∪ {z}. If J = I ∪ {z}, then player 1, by deviating from
v toQ, improves his utility by v1(Tz)− v1(Sz) > 0, which contradicts truthfulness. So, it must be
the case where J = I .
Now, consider the profileQ ′ = (v II1 ,v
II
2 ) ∈ V
6=
m where
v II2 j =
{
m+2 j−m−1 if j ∈ X
N1∪N2
2 (Q)∪
⋃
i∈I∪{z}Si ∪
⋃
i∉I∪{z}Ti
1+2 j−m−1 otherwise
Since, for i ∈ {1,2}, argmaxS∈Oi v
II
i
(S) only contains X
Ni
i
(v), by Lemma 3.12 we have X
N1∪N2
2 (Q
′)=
X
N1∪N2
2 (Q). Further, the set of favorable minimal exchanges with respect to Q
′ is {(Si ,Ti ) | i ∈
I ∪ {z}}. So, by Lemma 3.17 we have X
E1∪E2
2 (Q
′)=
(
E2
⋃
i∈I∪{z}Ti
)
∪
⋃
i∈I∪{z}Si .
So, by deviating fromQ toQ ′, player 2 improves his utility by v2(Sz)− v2(Tz)> 0, which con-
tradicts truthfulness. Therefore, there is no z ∈ [k] I such that (Sz ,Tz ) is favorable with respect to
v, and this concludes the proof.
B MissingMaterial from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.5. From theorem 3.6 we know that every truthful mechanism can be imple-
mented as a picking-exchange mechanism. So consider such a mechanism and let us examine
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the structure of sets Ni ,Ei and Oi . Notice that by the definition of picking-exchange mecha-
nisms, each player i controls Ni ∪Ei . If both Ni ,Ei are nonempty, or |Ei | > 1, or Oi contains a
non-singleton set, then the respective player has control over some pair of items. Thus we can
conclude that every possible mechanism can be implemented as a singleton picking-exchange
mechanism.
Remark B.1. Regarding the remaining proofs, it suffices to focus only on singleton picking-
exchange mechanisms. Indeed, by Theorem 3.6 we know that every truthful mechanism can be
implemented as a picking-exchangemechanism, and by Lemmata 4.3 and 4.5 only the singleton
picking-exchangemechanisms among themmay achieve some fairness guarantee.
Proof of Application 4.6. Initially it is easy to see that whenm = 1 orm = 2, the statement holds
in a trivial way for every singleton picking-exchangemechanisms. Indeed, in every instance each
player gets at most one item and thus the value a player derives in the worst case is greater or
equal to the value of the empty set (bundle of the other player minus an item).
In the case ofm = 3, in any instance one player gets one item and the other player two items.
The singleton picking-exchange mechanism guarantees that the player who gets one item is al-
located with at least his second best in terms of value, so the value he derives is always greater or
equal to the value of his least desirable item (bundle of the other player minus an item). On the
other hand, the player who is allocated with two items always derives value greater or equal to
the value of the empty set.
Finally, in the case ofm = 4 with |N1| = |N2| = 2, every player gets two items at every instance.
The singleton picking-exchange mechanism guarantees that each player will receive at least his
second best item, the value of which is greater or equal to the value of his third or fourth best
item.
On the other hand, in case of m ≥ 5 consider profile v1 = [1+ ǫ,1, ...,1]∪ [1,δ, ...,δ], v2 =
[1,δ, ...,δ]∪ [1+ ǫ,1, ...,1] where 1≫ ǫ≫ δ > 0. The first vector of values is for N1 (or E1) and the
second is for N2 (or E1); notice that it is possible for one of them to be empty. We only examine
singleton picking-exchangemechanisms (see Remark B.1). It is easy to see that in such a case, by
the pigeonhole principle, no singleton picking-exchangemechanism can achieve envy-freeness
up to one item for both players.
Proof of Application 4.7. We only need to prove that among all the singleton picking-exchange
mechanisms (see Remark B.1) there is no better approximation ratio than ⌊m/2⌋−1 for m ≥ 3.
Consider profile v1 = [1+ ǫ,1, ...,1]∪ [|N1 ∪ E1|,δ, ...,δ], v2 = [|N2 ∪ E2|,δ, ...,δ]∪ [1+ ǫ,1, ...,1],
where 1≫ ǫ≫ δ > 0. The first vector of values is for N1 (or E1) and the second is for N2 (or E1);
notice that it is possible for one of them to be empty.
It is easy to see that when both N1 ∪ E1, N2 ∪ E2 are nonempty, then µi = |Ni ∪ Ei | while
they both receive value that is slightly greater than 1. Therefore, no singleton picking-exchange
mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio than ⌈m/2⌉−1 for both players.
On the other hand, if N1∪E1 =; (the other case is symmetric) then this is the mechanism in
Amanatidis et al. [2016] that achieves exactly ⌊m/2⌋−1.
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